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Security Analysis Of Lightweight Schemes for RFID Systems
AB S T R A C T
This thesis mainly examines the security analysis of lightweight pro-
tocols proposed for providing security and privacy for RFID systems.
To achieve this goal, first we give a brief introduction of RFID systems.
The introduction includes: the history, system components, applica-
tions, standards and related issues of RFID systems. The main issues
which are highlighted in the thesis are security and privacy. One possible
solution to provide RFID systems with privacy and security is using
cryptography. But conventional cryptography is too big for the highly
constrained devices such as RFIDs. The alternative solution is using
lightweight cryptography which aims at squeezing the cryptographic
schemes into the RFID tags. A brief overview of the thesis is illustrated
in Figure 1.
This thesis consists of a categorization of the lightweight proposals
and related works in the literature. Finally, we try to explain how the
security of a lightweight scheme can be analyzed and evaluated. To do
so, the security requirements, adversarial models and potential attacks
for lightweight schemes are presented. In this part, we mainly focus on
the security analysis of the lightweight protocols because the security
analysis of the lightweight primitives and algorithms is more or less the
same as conventional primitives and has already been widely discussed
in the literature.
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Fig. 1: Overview of the thesis.
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1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 MO T I VAT I O N
The advances in wireless and mobile technologies have paved the way
for pervasive communication systems to be utilized in billions of ter-
minals in commercial operations. And it is just the beginning for some
new wireless technologies such as RFID with a deployment potential of
tens of billions of tags and a virtually unlimited application potential.
ITU reports predict a scenario of “Internet of things” in which billion
of objects and items are able to report information about their location,
identity, etc. through a wireless connections. Therefore, technologies
which enable unique identification of objects are fundamental parts of
Internet of things. This is where RFID technology emerges [6].
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is an automatic identification
and data capture technology that uses radio frequency (RF) to iden-
tify objects. This can be achieved by three main components in RFID
systems: RFID tags, RFID readers and a back-end system. RFID read-
ers communicate with RFID tags via a wireless channel to identify
them while the back-end system provides the readers the information
required to accomplish the identification process.
Using RFID technology has enabled identifying objects in large scales
automatically and in contact-less manner. Correspondingly, this technol-
ogy is currently being deployed in an extensive variety of applications
such as: automatic inventory, asset tracking, transportation payments,
entry access control, and electronic passports. In addition, overwhelm-
ing increase of demand for automatic inventory and tracking applica-
tions draws a bright future for RFIDs.
Nevertheless, every coin has two sides. As mentioned earlier, an RFID
reader and RFID tags communicate via a wireless channel. This com-
munication and the messages exchanged in between may be susceptible
to eavesdropping or interception. This is the point that some non-trivial
concerns such as security and privacy arise. It is nowadays feasible to
read the information of some RFID tags illegitimately and thus obtain
some information about their owners. Tracking the tags is also feasible
for some RFID tags. That is why RFID technology has not reached
the expected wide range of deployments and there exist numerous
controversies about the wide-scale deployment of it.
The above-mentioned concerns become more serious when dealing
with the inexpensive (low-cost) RFIDs normally used for mass distribu-
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tion. The major challenge in tackling to provide security for this kind
of RFID tags is that they have very constrained capabilities (storage, cir-
cuitry and power consumption), which makes them unable to perform
the most common security measures such as cryptography.
In order to find a concrete solution to this problem, a paradigm
shift from conventional solutions is required. The schemes which are
proposed as solution for providing low-cost RFIDs with security and
privacy are called lightweight schemes in the literature.
A considerable volume of papers have been published so far on
lightweight schemes. But the other side of the coin is how secure or
privacy-preserving these schemes are. This can be achieved through
security analysis of the schemes to ensure that they have not sacrificed
the security of the scheme for the sake of being lightweight. This is the
main subject of this thesis.
1 .2 OR G A N I Z AT I O N
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 gives
an overview of the RFID systems. In Section 3, the main issues in the
RFID systems, which are security and privacy are explored. Section
4 gives a classification of lightweight schemes in the literature and
contains some related works of each kind. In Section 5, it is shown how
to analyze the security of the lightweight schemes by explaining the
models and requirements for the security. The thesis concludes by a
brief introduction of our five papers in Section 6 and some future work
in Section 7.
2 RFID SY S T E M S
2.1 SY S T E M CO M P O N E N T S
In general, an RFID system consists of tags, readers, and a back-end
system (database) (Fig.2). Typically, an RFID tag is attached to an object
and an RFID reader communicates with the tag to identify the object
to which the tag is attached. The tag carries information about the
object for identification purposes. This information can be a serial
number, model number, or other characteristics of the object to identify
or distinguish the object. A copy of this information is stored in the
back-end system which provides it to the readers on demand. In the
2
following subsections, the systems components are studied in more
details.
2 .1 .1 RFID TA G S
An RFID tag is a tiny radio device that is also referred to as a transponder.
It comprises two main parts which are common among all types of
tags: internal circuitry attached to a small flat onboard antenna. However,
some types like active tags have an extra part which is a battery.
The tags are attached to different objects and carry the information
which can identify those objects. Then, this information can be read
contact-lessly by readers. There are different sorts of tags available
in the market. These differences between tags will be examined with
respect to power sources, frequencies, writing capabilities and the cost [5].
• Passive Tags : Passive tags do not contain battery. Instead, they
absorb their power from the radio wave transmitted by the reader.
Passive tags transmit data by reflecting power from the reader.
This is also referred to as backscatter modulation for systems that
operate in the far-field, and load modulation for systems that op-
erate in the near-field [2]. The received power is used for two
purposes: powering the internal circuitry on the tag and com-
munication through the onboard antenna for responding to the
reader interrogations.
It should be noted that many RFID experts believe that passive
tags are the future of RFID and this can be achieved when the
cost of individual tags reaches less then five cents [5].
TagReaderBack-End
Fig. 2: RFID system components.
3
Security Analysis of Lightweight Schemes for RFIDs
• Active Tags: As their name suggests, active tags include an onboard
power source as a battery which provides power for both internal
circuitry and the antenna. This imposes additional expenses on
manufacturers and correspondingly makes the active tags more
expensive than the passive ones. However, the range of active tags
is generally far more (Table 1).
• Semi-Active Tags: Semi-Active tags are manufactured to retain the
advantages while eliminating the disadvantages of passive and
active tags. Semi-active tags typically use an internal battery to
power internal circuitry. However, the battery power is not used
for communication via the antenna. The power for communication
is received from the reader as in the passive tags. In this way
some battery power can be saved for a longer period of time
and correspondingly makes this type of tag more cost-effective
comparing to the active tags.
Tags primarily operate at three ranges of frequencies: low frequency
(LF), high frequency (HF) or ultra-high-frequency (UHF). Nevertheless,
there are some active tags for specialized applications may utilize
microwave frequencies as well [14]:
• Low-Frequency Tags: This type of tags operate at the frequency of
125/134 KHz and are most commonly used for access control,
animal tracking, and asset tracking.
• High-Frequency Tags: This type of tags operate at the frequency of
13.56 MHz. At this frequency the interference caused by metals
or water is eliminated. The range of communication in HF tags is
generally confined to some inches. Thus, HF tags are primarily
suitable for inventory or smart card applications where the tagged
items are in close proximity to the reader.
• Ultra High-Frequency Tags: This type of tags operate at the fre-
quency range of either 850-950 MHz or 2400-2500 MHz. So, they
can offer up to about 3 meters communication range at a high
speed. The range of UHF tags makes them more applicable to
shipping dock type applications.
RFID tags are made of two different types of chips, regarding their
writing capabilities: read-only chips and read-write chips [14]:
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Specifications Low-cost High-cost
RFID Tag RFID Tag
Power Source Passive Active
Storage 32 - 1K bits 32 KB - 70 KB
Security Capabilities 250 - 4K gates 3DES,SHA-1,RSA
Reading Distance Up to 3 m About 10 cm
Price 0.05-0.1 euro Several euros
Table 1: Specifications for Low-cost and High-cost RFID Tags [9].
• Read-only Tags: As their name suggests, read-only tags contain
some unique information which is stored during the manufactur-
ing process and can not be changed.
• Read-Write Tags: The user can either read or write information
to a read-write tag when the tag is within range of the reader.
Read-Write tags are naturally more expensive that read-only ones.
RFID tags are divided into two categories regarding their price: low-cost
and high-cost RFID tags (Table 1).
• High-cost tags: High-cost tags are mostly active tags with more
computational and storage capabilities compared to passive ones.
While the communication range of the active tags are less.
• Low-cost tags: The low-cost tags are mostly passive and their com-
putational and storage capabilities are highly constrained.
A comparison of the specifications in these two types of tags are illus-
trated in Table 1 [9].
2 .1 .2 RFID RE A D E R S
An RFID reader, also known as an interrogator or transceivers, is a device
that can read and/or write data to an RFID tag. The data is exchanged
between a reader and a tag via their antennas by electromagnetic RF
waves. In addition to data, the waves transmitted from readers are also
the source of power for the passive tags. Readers are generally of two
types: simple scanner and complex(smart) reader.
Simple scanners may be handheld or mounted to mobile equipment
such as a forklift. This makes them useful for the situations where
5
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the reader is mobile and moves toward the objects with tags. On the
other hand, scanners are mostly used where data verification in the
interrogation is also required. Therefore, the rate of data communication
by scanners is relatively low. An application that is well suited to
scanners is order fulfillment [5].
In more complex or rapidly moving readers, the electromagnetic
signal is transmitted by a smart reader.
2 .1 .3 BA C K -EN D SY S T E M
The data acquired by the readers in tag interrogations is usually passed
to a back-end system (e.g. a host computer) to be processed into useful
information. The host computer is a system with application specific
software. The software can include RFID middleware to set up and
control the reader and some type of database software to control the
information received from the reader [5].
2 .1 .4 CO M M U N I C AT I O N S
Communications in RFID systems can be categorized into two parts:
communications between the reader and the tag and communication
between the reader and the back-end.
• Reader and Tags: The communication between the reader and the
tag takes place via an asymmetric channel. The forward (reader-to-
tag) and backward (tag-to-reader) channel.
For passive tags, the forward channel is much stronger than the
backward channel because they not only receive data but also the
power. As a result the forward channel may be intercepted from a
far longer distance than the backward channel. For example, the
forward channel of a passive tag operating at 915 MHz may be
eavesdropped or intercepted at the range of almost 100 meters,
while this range is less than 3 meters for the backward channel
for the same tag.
To make the communication of readers and tags more efficient
coding and modulation are necessary. But the coding/modulation
method should be chosen differently for forward and backward
channels due to different specifications in the channels.
Readers are able to transmit at greater power; however they suffer
from bandwidth limitations in the forward channel. On the other
6
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2.1.4 Communication Between Tags and Readers
One of the most important characteristics of RFID systems in contrast to barcode
systems is that the communication with the reader does not need a line-of-sight.
There is also no wiring required. Instead, the communication between RFID tags
and RFID readers is performed by electromagnetic means. This has advantages but
also has inherent problems.
Reference model
Communication in networks is often separated into a number of orthogonal layers
for coping with complexity and for better filing of technologies. When talking about
the communication between computers, often the ISO/OSI reference model [ISO94]
is used. The communication between tags and readers can be discussed on the basis
of a simplified model in which the lowest two layers correspond to the ones in the
ISO/OSI reference model and a third layer corresponds to all upper layers in the
ISO/OSI reference model, see figure 2.3. A similar layering has been presented in
[AO05a].
Physical Layer
Link Layer
Application Layer
Transmission of single symbols
on the physical medium
Transmission of data frames and
enabling multiple access
Application-oriented protocols
Fig. 2.3. Layering of communication between tags and readers
The lowest layer, which is called physical layer, defines the transmission over
the physical medium, i.e. used frequencies, modulation techniques, signal forming,
etc. Details about physical layer issues can be found in [Sch01]. Above that layer,
the link layer is placed, in which the transmission of data frames, i.e. sequences of
bits belonging together, occurs. At this layer the algorithms for multiple access to
the shared medium can be found. Protocol messages, e.g. for reading and writing the
memory of tags or authentication algorithms are situated in the upper application
layer.
The lowest two layers need to be standardized to a large extent to ensure inter-
operability between tags and readers of different vendors. These needed standards
already exist, see below in subsection 2.1.4. But on the application layer, there is
freedom for own developments, i.e. user specific tags, without breaking interoper-
ability.
Fig. 3: ISO/OSI reference model for tag and reader communication.
hand, in the backward channel, tags can transmit messages only
to a short range due to lack of power but the bandwidth limitation
is not very strict.
Therefore, Manchester or NRZ (Non-Return-to-Zero) and PPM
or PWM coding techniques are used in forward and backward
channels respectively. For modulation there are three alternatives:
Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK), Frequency Shift Keying (FSK)
and Phase Shift Keying (PSK) which are used depending on the
application requirements [9].
The communication between tags and readers can be discussed
on the basis of a simplified model of ISO/OSI reference model in
which there are three different layers: physical layer link layer, and
application layer [4] (Fig. 3). At the lowest layer, which is called the
physical layer, the transmission over the physical medium, such
as: used frequencies, modulation techniques, signal forming, etc.,
is defined. Above that layer the transmission of data frames is de-
fined in the link layer. The layer which is placed at the top presents
the algorithms for multiple accesses to the shared medium and
protocol messages for reading and writing the memory of tags or
authentication protocol. This layer is called application layer [4].
• Reader and Back-end: The communication between the reader and
the back-end system is performed in a totally different way. The
reader has the capability of communicating to the back-end via
different types of communication protocols depending on the dis-
tance between the reader and the host, the required data transfer
rate, and the system budget. Common types of protocols include
RS-232, RS-485, and Ethernet-based systems [5].
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2.2 H I S TO RY
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is usually considered
to be the next generation of barcode and will replace barcode systems
in the very near future. The barcode is currently the most common
type of automatic data capture (ADC) technology in use. The history
of barcodes goes back to 1932 when Wallace Flint introduced a system
which used punch cards to dispensed products to customers automat-
ically. This was the first documented instance of the advantages of
an automated checkout and bar codes. Forty years later, Flint, as the
vice president of the National Association of Food Chains, played an
important role as to support bar code standardization that led to the
uniform product code (UPC) [5].
In the case of RFID technology, we can not say that it is a recent
technology, although it has been recently become practical for business
applications. It is difficult to trace its true history because most research
was done behind closed doors for military purposes. But we can say
that its history goes back to prior to World War II when Radar was
discovered in 1935 by Sir Robert Alexander Watson Watt to identify
friend or foe aircraft during the Second World War [13]. However, one
of the first major scientific papers on RFID was “Communication by
means of reflected power” written by Harry Stockman in 1948. Since
then, plenty of research studies and patents have been published in
this field. But major events in RFID commercial development can be
traced to the 1975 declassification of research by Los Alamos Scientific
Labs (LASL) with the published paper “Shortrange radio-telemetry for
electronic identification using modulated backscatter” by Koelle et al
[3].
In the 1980s, the RFID technology started to be widely deployed in
the industry especially in transportation applications and personnel
access in US and short-range systems for animal tracking and business
applications in Europe. The first commercial toll application of RFID
technology began to be used in Europe in 1987 and was soon followed
in the United States. [3].
In early 1999, the Uniform Code Council, EAN International, Proctor
& Gamble, and Gillette established the Auto-ID Center at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). For the first time it was there
where, David Brock and Sanjay Sarma, initiated the idea of integrating
passive RFID tags in products in order to track items in the supply chain.
They suggested the idea of using a unique number (serial number) on
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the tags for identification. Data associated with the serial number on the
tag would be stored in a back-end system which would be accessible
over the Internet [13].
There was increased prominence for passive RFID tagging, as a result
of the influence of one hundred or so large end-user companies, and
led by the Auto-ID Centre, from 1999 to 2003 [5]. This work was then
extended by the Auto-ID research lab to countries such as Australia, the
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, and China. In 2003 the tehnology
was licensed to the Uniform Code Council (UCC), which created EPC
Global, being a combined activity between EAN International and the
Auto-ID Centre, and with an aim to commercialize the EPC technology.
In 2003, the research activity of the Auto-ID Centre was transferred
to Auto-ID labs, and GS1 EPC GLobal is now responsible for the stan-
dards associated with such for RFID technologies [13]. Up to now, two
generations of standards have been ratified by be the organization for
RFID tags.
Today, the industry support is evidenced in the fact that some of
the biggest retailers in the world-Albertsons, Metro, Target, Tesco, Wal
Mart-and the U.S. Department of Defense have initiated plans to use
EPC technology to track goods in their supply chain. The pharmaceu-
tical, tire, defense, and other industries are also moving to adopt the
technology [13].
2 .3 AP P L I C AT I O N S
Initially, the deployment of RFID technology was confined to some
simple applications like inventory and antitheft. However, it has been
deployed in more sophisticated areas today, such as in electronic IDs
and passports. A sample of applications is shown here [16]:
• Automotive: Car manufacturers mostly exploit the RFID technol-
ogy as anti-theft immobilizers in their products to improve their
security.
• Animal Tracking: This application of RFID technology is used for
either tracking wild animals in scientific studies, or tracking pets
when they are lost.
• Asset Tracking: Libraries use RFID technology on books to manage
them in circulation more efficiently and limit theft. Airlines use
9
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this technology to track the luggage or cargos for better manage-
ment. These are just two examples of asset tracking applications
of RFID technology.
• Contact-less Payments: Blue-chip companies such as American Ex-
press, ExxonMobil, and MasterCard use RFID technology on their
products for contact-less payment.
• Supply Chain: Some retailers such as WalMart, Target, BestBuy
use RFID technology to keep a record of their products, limit
shoplifting, and reduce the check-out time of the costumers.
2 .4 STA N D A R D S
The EPCGlobal and the ISO (International Standards Organization) are
both leading figures in issuing standards for RFIDs.
2 .4 .1 EPCGL O B A L STA N D A R D S
The objective of EPCGlobal standards is identifying objects through
a uniquely formatted number kept on each tag, with associated data
stored in a back-end system. To achieve this goal, EPCglobal has in-
troduced the Electronic Product Code (EPC) as a scheme designed for
universal object identification.
EPC is a unique naming scheme for objects containing a header
and three sets of data (Fig. 4). The header identifies the EPC’s version
number, allowing for different lengths or types of EPC later on. The
second part of the EPC number identifies the EPC manager, most likely
the manufacturer of the product. The third, called object class refers to
the exact type of product and the fourth is the serial number unique to
the item. In the EPCglobal standard, the RFID tags have been divided
into five different classes which fulfill different industry’s need. Class 0
is a read-only passive tag with 64 bit EPC. Class 1 refers to write-once
read-many passive tags that carry unique ID, password-based access
control, and a kill switch that can be used in deactivating the tag at a
TagReaderBack-End
Header    EPC Manager       Object Class Serial Number
8 bits 28 bits 24 bits 36 bits
Fig. 4: Example of an 96-bit EPCGlobal tag.
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point-of-sale. Class 2 extends Class 1 by allowing rewritable memory
and authenticated access control. Class 3 refers to semi-active tags that
carry an integral power source to supplement captured energy. Finally,
Class 4 refers to active tags that enable tag-to-tag communication, more
complex protocols, and ad hoc networking. It should be noted that the
EPC size in all classes1–4 is 96 bits [1].
The current version of EPCglobal standard is known as UHF Genera-
tion 2 (UHF Gen 2) [115]. The EPC Class-1 Generation-2(C1G2) is now
considered as the universal standard for low-cost passive RFID tags.
Class-1 RFID tags belong to the category of low-cost tags mentioned
in Section 2.1.1. Because of its very limited storage and computational
capabilities, this class of tag cannot support conventional cryptographic
primitives. So there is a lot of research into how to bolster the security
level of such tags [6].
In the following the main specifications of EPC Class-1 Generation-2
RFID tag are listed [17]:
• C1G2 RFID tag is passive; it implies that it absorbs the power
from readers.
• C1G2 RFID tag communicates at UHF band (800–960 MHz) with
the communication range of 2-10m.
• C1G2 ’s privacy protection mechanism is to render the tag perma-
nently unusable by using the kill command. To avoid illegitimate
usage of this command a 32-bit kill PIN is also required.
• Read/Write to C1G2 RFID tag’s memory is allowed only after
receiving access command with a valid 32-bit access PIN.
• C1G2 RFID tag supports on-chip 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code
(CRC) and 16-bit Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG).
The 16-bit PRNG has the following properties:
– The probability that any 16-bit pseudo random value shows
up as the next output is between 0.8×2−16 and 1.25 ×2−16.
– Among 10000 tags, the probability that any two or more tags
generate the same sequence of 16-bit numbers is less than
10−3.
– The probability of predicting the next pseudo-random num-
ber from the previous outputs is less than 2.5×10−4.
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The CRC checksum is used to detect error in transmitted data and
the corresponding CRC polynomial of degree 16 is [11]:
x16 + x12 + x5 + 1
2.4 .2 ISO STA N D A R D S
The ISO is very active in developing RFID standards for supply chain
operations and is nearing completion on multiple standards to identify
items and different types of logistics containers. Some examples of ISO
Standards in this field are: ISO 14443 for “proximity” cards and ISO
15693 for “vicinity” cards both recommend 13.56 MHz. ISO 11748 /
11785 for standard for animal identification and ISO 17364 for transport
units [4].
But the most important one of this kind are the ISO 18000 series
which are a set of proposed RFID specifications for air interface com-
munications of item management. The ISO 18000–6C of this series and
EPC Class1 Generation2 are harmonized to reach a global standard,
and are referred to as ISO 18000–6C.
2 .5 CH A L L E N G E S
Despite the incentives in RFID deployment, this technology is facing
some non-trivial challenges which some of them are listed below [24]:
• Large volumes of data: Reading RFID tags data is currently possible
at a very high speed of several times per second. Therefore, in a
very short time a large amount of raw data is read by the readers
and should be processed by the back-end system. The processing
of these large volumes of data is a bottleneck for the system.
• Product information maintenance: When a high volume of RFID
tags are processed by the back-end system, the readers must
the continually retrieve some attributes of the tags from a back-
end system which results in scalability challenges for large-scale
implementations.
• Configuration and management of readers and devices: When a large
number of readers and related hardware devices are utilized in
multiple facilities, their configuration and management becomes
challenging.
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• Data integration across multiple facilities: When the facilities of an
enterprise are geographically distributed, real time management
of data on a central back-end system can place a significant burden
on the network infrastructure.
• Data ownership and partner data integration: During each product’s
lifecycle its owner might vary several times. When the product is
tagged, the owners of that product at each time must be given the
associated data of the tag. This is where the challenge pertaining
to the ownership and integration of the data emerge.
• Data security and privacy: The last but foremost challenge in the
field of RFIDs is undoubtedly security and privacy challenges
which could have a significant impact on the system. This chal-
lenge is investigated in details in the following section.
3 PR I VA C Y A N D SE C U R I T Y IS S U E S
There are two main issues in RFID systems which are highlighted in
this thesis: privacy issues and security issues. These issues, although
interrelated, are different. With respect to RFID, we define these issues
as follows [15]:
• Privacy: the ability of the RFID system to keep the meaning of the
information transmitted between the tag and the reader secure
from non-intended recipients.
• Security: the ability of the RFID system to keep the information
transmitted between the tag and the reader secure from non-
intended recipients.
3 .1 PR I VA C Y IS S U E S
The major concern which thwarts widespread deployment of RFIDs is
the possibility of privacy violation. This issue seems to be very difficult
to tackle because it originates from the basic functions of RFID tags.
As mentioned, each RFID tag contains a unique ID which identifies it
through an RF wireless interrogation. This results in high risk of identi-
fication or tracking of bearers by illegitimate entities unless sufficient
protection is used.
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The attacker obtains the ID and any security information of a tag and uses
these to deceive a reader into accepting the identity of this particular tag. This
method of attack can be carried out using a device that is capable of emulating
any kind of tag or by producing a new tag as a duplicate of the old one (cloning).
This kind of attack results in several transponders with the same identity being in
circulation.
5.3.9 Falsiﬁcation of Contents
Data can be falsiﬁed by unauthorized write access to the tag. This type of attack
is suitable for targeted deception, if the ID (serial number) and any other security
information that might exist (e.g., keys) remains unchanged when the attack is
carried out. This way the reader continues to recognize the identity of the tran-
sponders correctly. This kind of attack is possible only in the case of RFID systems
that, in addition to ID and security information, store other information on the
tag. (Figure 5.3)
5.4 Security Measures
Fortunately, as threats become faster and more aggressive, so does the response.
In this section, we enumerate the various proposed eﬀective approaches to the
RFID security threat and risks. Also some new methods to the problem are
highlighted.  
data including IDfalsify contents
falsify identity
falsify identity
deactivate
detach
tagged item
air interface
eavesdropping
blocking jamming
transponder reader
Figure 5.3 Basic types of attack in RFID systems.Fig. 5: Security Issues in RFID systems [6].
In general, violation of privacy has two forms: information leakage
and location tracking. Information leakage includes obtaining the infor-
mation from the tag to identify its owner, his preferences or physical
condition. For example, if a person carries a bottle of medications with
attached RFID tag, obtaining the information of the RFID tag may point
to his disease [1]. As RFID tags can be attached to almost every item
we use in everyday life, obtaining their information can reveal a vast
amount of data about a person’s life style and therefore violates his/her
privacy.
This kind of information might be interesting for variety of entities
e.g. marketers can obtain and use these leaked information to link
buyers to specific items and make personal profiles in order to give
them specialized sale offers.
On the other hand, even if the tag responses do not leak information
about the product it has been attached to, static responses of the tags
during interrogations helps with tracking the owners.
3 .2 SE C U R I T Y IS S U E S
The security issues can exist in all RFID systems’ components. In this
subsection, we briefly explore some of the security issues related to the
tags, readers and the communication between them. These issues are
illustrated in Figure 5 regarding the part of system they are targeting
[6].
14
3.2 .1 SE C U R I T Y IS S U E S O F T H E TA G
Some of the security issues for the tags are [7]:
• Falsification of ID: In this security issue, an attacker first obtains/steals
the ID or other sensitive data of a tag and uses it to impersonate
the tag and deceive the readers in further interrogations. This can
be achieved by using an emulator tag or copying the obtained
information on another tag (cloning or counterfeiting).
• Unauthorized deactivation: Each RFID tag based on EPC C1G2 has
a mechanism for deactivation using kill command. Unauthorized
usage of this command can render the tag unusable in further
interrogations and deactivate the tag permanently.
• Physical destruction: Tags can be physically destroyed in different
ways, for example by using strong electromagnetic fields (e.g. a
microwave oven) or by some chemical substances. In the case of
active tags, they could also be rendered unusable by removing
their battery.
• Detaching the tag: A tag can be separated from the tagged item.
The detached tag may even subsequently be attached to a dif-
ferent item. This type of attack poses a fundamental security
problem because RFID systems are completely dependent on the
unambiguous identification of the tags.
• Falsification of Contents: If the tags contain some extra data except
from ID and security information, the data can be falsified by
unauthorized write access to the tag while the ID (serial number)
and any other security information (e.g. keys) remain unchanged.
In this way, the readers continue to recognize the identity of the
tags correctly while their contents have been changed.
3 .2 .2 SE C U R I T Y IS S U E S O F T H E RE A D E R
Readers are also susceptible to falsifying ID attack. In a secure RFID
system, the reader must prove its authorization to the tag. If an attacker
wants to read the data with his own reader, this reader must fake the
identity of an authorized reader. If an attacker accomplishes to falsify
the reader’s ID, she will be able not only to have access to the tag’s
information but also to the back-end system.
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3.2 .3 SE C U R I T Y IS S U E S O F T H E CO M M U N I C AT I O N S
The communications between the components of RFID systems also
suffer from security issues. Nevertheless, the level of vulnerability sig-
nificantly differs from communication between the tag and the reader
to communication between the reader and back-end system. While
the latter is considered robust and almost secure due to application of
standard security measures such as SSL or TLS, the former is the most
vulnerable part of the whole system. Some of the security issues in the
communication between the tag and the reader are listed below [7].
• Eavesdropping: The communication between reader and tags via
the air interface can be monitored by intercepting and decoding
the radio signals. This is one of the most specific threats to RFID
systems. The eavesdropped information could for example be
used to collect sensitive information about a person. It could also
be used to perform a replay attack.
• Replay Attack: The attacker can obtain and save all the exchanged
messages between a tag and a reader and either simulate the tag
or the reader towards one another.
• Jamming: The air interface between reader and tag can be dis-
turbed in order to attack the integrity or the availability (Dos
attack) of the communication. This could be achieved by powerful
transmitters at a large distance, but also through more passive
means such as shielding.
• Man-in-the-middle: A man-in-the-middle attack is a form of attack
in which the adversary provokes or manipulates the communi-
cation between the reader and the tag, where manipulating the
communication means relay, withhold, or insert messages.
• Relay attack: A relay attack [21] is similar to the well known man-
in-the-middle attack. A device is placed in between the reader
and the tag such that all communication between reader and
tag goes through this device, while both tag and reader think
they communicate directly to each other. In the case of payment
systems, the attacker is able to charge some one else’s payment
device (e.g. a smart card with an RFID tag) to buy something for
herself.
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3.3 SO L U T I O N S
Proposed solutions to security and privacy issues in RFID systems
include defensive measures that could be taken in two levels: technical
and management levels. To have a concrete solution for RFID system, it
requires having a holistic perspective to the problem and adopting a
combination of measures in both levels. In the management level, it is
required to:
• have an up-to-date risk assessment of the whole system to be aware
of the possible threats and vulnerabilities in the system.
• establish policies for the security of the data to tackle the risks.
• incorporate security solutions that are transparent.
• realize that security is an ongoing process.
There are quite a few related works in this layer in the literature such
as [25] as well as some guidelines and recommendations [26, 27]. One
of the first and best known proposals in this context is “RFID Bill of
Rights” [18] which proposes five privacy addressed articles for RFID
systems: (1) The right to know whether products contain RFID tags, (2)
the right to have tags removed or deactivate upon purchase of these
products, (3) the right to use RFID-enabled services without RFID tags
(i.e. right to opt out without penalty), (4) the right to access an RFID
tag’s stored data along with the possibility to correct and amend that
data, and finally (5) the right to know when, where, and why the tags
are being read [4].
In addition, there are plenty of proposals in the technical level which
can be categorized in four following groups [3]:
• Tag Killing Command or Permanent Deactivation: Using the kill com-
mand in RFID tags in an authorized manner (e.g. after shopping
the tagged item) makes the tag permanently deactivated and
thus renders any subsequent unauthorized reading impossible.
It should be noted that although killing tags effectively enforces
consumer privacy, it eliminates all of the post-purchase benefits
of RFID for the customer [20].
• A Faraday Cage or Jamming Approach: Faraday Cage is a metal
or foil-lined container that is impenetrable to radio frequency
waves. By putting RFID tags inside a Faraday Cage, they can be
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made protected from reading by isolating them from any kind of
electromagnetic waves.
The reading of RFID tags may also be jammed by devices that emit
powerful and disruptive radio signals. But usually such jamming
devices violate government regulations on radio emissions [23].
• Use of Blocker Tags: A blocker tag is a special RFID tag that prevents
unwanted scanning of tags. This idea is first introduced by Juels,
Rivest, and Szydlo in [19] to protect privacy.
• Cryptography: To achieve privacy in RFID systems, a typical solu-
tion can be the adoption of cryptographic techniques. Neverthe-
less, this can not be achieved through conventional cryptography
due to special limitations of passive low-cost RFID tags. In the
following section, we will discuss the paradigm shift which took
place in cryptography to fulfill these limitations and led to coin
the term lightweight cryptography in the literature.
4 L I G H T W E I G H T CRY P TO G R A P H Y F O R RFIDS
In order to provide security and privacy for low-cost RFID tags which
have limitations in terms of memory and power, we must overcome the
barrier of adapting the current computationally intensive operations
of security countermeasures (e.g. conventional cryptography) to these
limitations at an acceptable speed without compromising on security.
This is where the new field of lightweight cryptography emerges.
There should typically be a trade-off between cost, performance, and
security (Fig.6). It is straightforward to optimize for any two of the three
design goals, but a trade-off between all three is difficult [10]. That is
an underlying research area in search for a proper solution.
The first step towards this goal is having an explicit overview of
the low-cost RFID limitations. Today, the EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2
(ISO 18000-6) standard is a base point. However, the current security
mechanisms in this standard are very weak and require amendments e.g.
the tag ID (here: Electronic Product Code) can be easily eavesdropped
by unauthorized readers and the only protection mechanism is a 16-bit
checksum CRC. The desirable security and privacy countermeasures
include: authentication, encryption, and message integrity.
To meet these countermeasures, one of the best known ways is using
cryptography but with considering the limitations for low-cost RFID
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Fig. 6: Triangle of trade-off among security, cost and performance.
tags. As mentioned earlier, this is the scope of lightweight cryptogra-
phy. The attempts to amend the current standard in RFID technology
to make them more secure led to publishing the family of ISO/IEC
29192 standards. This standard defines properties of lightweight cryp-
tographic primitives in four parts. In the first part of this standard
some general properties of lightweight cryptography based on target
platforms are presented. Properties such as chip size and/or energy
consumption in hardware implementations and the code and/or RAM
size in software implementations. In the second, third and forth parts of
this standard, some lightweight algorithms from block ciphers, stream
ciphers and public keys are presented respectively.
In this section, we explore the lightweight cryptography in two main
categories: lightweight primitives or algorithms and lightweight protocols
(Figure 7) in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 respectively. In the case of
lightweight primitives, we only compare some of the most recent algo-
rithms of each type and their properties in a table. But in the case of
lightweight protocols, we provide some well-known examples of each
kind.
4 .1 L I G H T W E I G H T PR I M I T I V E S
In this section, we explore the most current state-of-art in lightweight
primitives or algorithms which are designed to meet the low-cost RFID
limitations. Lightweight primitives usually used as building blocks of
lightweight protocols presented in Section 4.2 to be deployed on RFID
tags.
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Fig. 7: Lightweight Cryptography.
4.1 .1 SY M M E T R I C KE Y PR I M I T I V E S
In this subsection, we study block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash func-
tions and random number generators.
• Block Ciphers: Block ciphers are one of the most fundamental
cryptographic primitives. A typical block cipher Ek is a mapping
which maps a binary message of length n as plain text to another
binary message of the same length as cipher text i.e. Ek : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n by using a key k.
The history of conventional block ciphers goes back to 1977 when
the DES algorithm was introduced, but the history of lightweight
block ciphers is much more recent. It goes back to 1997 by the
introduction of the XTEA block cipher [28]. Since then, there have
been plenty of lightweight block cipher proposals. Some of the
recent proposals for lightweight block ciphers are compared in
Table 2 with their specifications.
To have a more fair comparison, the ciphers are compared regard-
ing the area required to implement them on hardware in gate
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Algorithm Area Block Key Speed Technology
(GE) size size (Kbps) (µm)
mCRYPTON [35] 2,500 96 64 492.3 0.13
CLEFIA[39] 4,950 128 128 355.6 0.09
AES[39] 3,100 128 128 80.0 0.13
HIGHT[30] 3,048 64 128 188.2 0.25
SEA[40] 3,758 96 96 103 0.13
DESXL[31] 2,168 64 184 44.4 0.18
PRESENT[29] 1,570 64 80 200 0.18
KATAN[33] 1,054 64 80 25.1 0.13
KTANTAN[33] 688 64 80 25.1 0.13
PRINT[34] 402 48 80 3.2 0.18
LED[37] 1,872 64 80 3.4 0.18
KLEIN[38] 1,220 64 80 207 0.18
Piccolo[36] 616 64 80 432 0.13
LBlock[41] 1,320 64 80 200 0.18
Table 2: Lightweight Block Ciphers
equivalent(GE), their speed in Kbps at the frequency of 100KHz
and their CMOS technology in µm.
As it can be seen the proposed schemes attempt to meet the
limitations of passive low-cost RFIDs. From this list, PRESENT
and CLEFIA are being standardized in the second part of ISO/IEC
29192 standard as lightweight block ciphers.
• Stream Ciphers: Stream ciphers provide an alternative to block
ciphers for symmetric encryption. They are sometimes considered
as particularly efficient, although this may not generally hold true
[2].
Stream ciphers used as a generator of a pseudo random string of
binary bits as keystream. The key stream is generated by using a
key and an initialization vector at the same length of plaintext.
Then, the keystream is simply XORed by the plaintext to give the
ciphertext.
In contrast to block ciphers, there are not many proposals for
lightweight stream ciphers. The most prominent ones are two of
the hardware-oriented ciphers remained in the eStream project’s
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Algorithm Area Interface Bits Speed Technology
(GE) (bit/cycle) (Kbps) (µm)
Grain[68]
1,294 1 100 0.13
2,200 8 800 0.13
Trivium [68]
2,599 1 100 0.13
2,800 8 800 0.13
Enocoro v.2 [70] 2,700 8 800 0.18
Table 3: Lightweight Stream Ciphers
portfolio, Grain v1 and Trivium [42] along with Enocoro [70].
These three lightweight stream ciphers are compared in Table
3. The Enocoro and Trivium algorithms are in the process of
standardization in the third part of ISO/IEC 29192 as lightweight
stream ciphers. It should be noted that some recent lightweight
stream ciphers such as WG7 [71] and A2U2 [72] which attempted
to improve the efficiency of the lightweight stream ciphers did
not prospered due to significant security breaches [73, 74].
There is also a third group of hybrid algorithms in the literature such
as Hummingbirds v.1 [43] and v.2 [44] which are more authentication
encryption schemes.
• Minimalism in Cryptography: A major theme in cryptographic re-
search is the analysis of minimal constructions. For example, many
papers were published on the minimal cryptographic assumptions
which are necessary and sufficient in order to construct various
types of secure primitives. To lend clarity to our discussion, we
should say that the term minimal means a local minima which
becomes insecure when any one of their elements is eliminated,
not a minimum scheme which is global minima among all the
possible constructions [46].
– Minimal Stream Cipher: In the case of stream ciphers, the
simplest possible secure scheme is the one-time pad. Since
any encryption algorithm requires a secret key, and XORing
is the simplest conceivable way to mix it with the plain-text
bits.
– Minimal Block Cipher: In the case of block ciphers, this prob-
lem was first addressed by Even and Mansour in 1991 [45].
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They were inspired by the DESX construction proposed to
protect DES against exhaustive search attacks by XORing two
independent pre-whitening and post-whitening keys to the
plaintext and ciphertext (respectively). The Even-Mansour
(EM) scheme used such whitening keys, but eliminated the
keyed block cipher in the middle, replacing it with a fixed
random permutation (F) that everyone can share. The re-
sultant scheme is extremely simple: To encrypt a plaintext
(P), XOR it with one key (K1), apply to it a publicly known
permutation (F), and XOR the result with a second key(K2)
[46].
C = EMFK1,K2(P) = F (P⊕ K1)⊕ K2 (1)
To argue that the Even-Mansour scheme is minimal, its de-
signers noted in [45] that eliminating either one of the two
XORed keys makes it easy to invert the known effect of per-
mutation on the plaintext or ciphertext, and thus to recover
the other key from a single known plaintext/ciphertext pair.
Eliminating the permutation is also disastrous, since it makes
the scheme completely linear.
However, Shamir et al in [46] showed that, the two-key EM
block cipher is not minimal in the sense that it can be further
simplified into a single-key variant (K1 = K2) with half as
many key bits which has exactly the same provable security.
4 .1 .2 HA S H FU N C T I O N S
Hash functions yield a digest of a message which plays an important
role in message authentication, data integrity, and digital signatures.
A hash function denoted by h maps a binary sting x with arbitrary
length to an output binary string y = h(x) of fixed length. Using hash
functions is also popular in security and privacy protocol proposals for
RFID systems.
Table 4 compares some of the recent lightweight hash functions
and their specifications. It should be noted that the algorithms listed
below may have different variants regarding block size, output size
or internal state size; but only one of the variants is presented as a
representative. There is also a lightweight message authentication code
(MAC) algorithms [52] which is well designed to be suited to RFID-
based challenge-response authentication protocols.
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Algorithm Area(GE) Block Output Speed Technology
size size (Kbps)* (µm)
D-Quark [51] 1,702 160 176 2.27 0.18
Armadillo-C [69] 5,406 160 160 25 0.18
DM-Present [48] 1,600 64 64 14.63 0.18
H-Present[48] 2,330 128 128 11.45 0.18
Keccak[49] 1,300 160 200 1.86 0.13
Photon[50] 1,396 160 160 2.70 0.18
Spongent[47] 2,190 160 176 17.78 0.18
Table 4: Lightweight Hash Functions.
∗Speed is given for a clock frequency of 100 kHz, assuming a long message.
4.1 .3 RA N D O M NU M B E R GE N E R ATO R S
A Random Number Generator (RNG) is a device or procedure which
produces a series of numbers or bits which are statistically independent
and identically distributed [2].
To produce random numbers in practical security applications how-
ever, a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) is used. PRNG is
an algorithm which generates an output sequence of bits which look
like random informally meaning that prediction of any output bit of
a PRNG is not be possible by a polynomial time algorithm with the
probability of significantly greater than 0.5.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, there is already a lightweight 16-bit
built-in PRNG on passive RFID tags compliant to EPCGlobal Class1
Gen2 standard. There are also a few proposals for lightweight random
number generators in the literature. These schemes attempt to fulfill not
only the EPCGlobal standard requirements for PRNG stated in Section
2.4.1, but also NIST requirements for random number generators [96].
Some of the lightweight PRNG schemes are listed in Table 5.
4 .1 .4 PU B L I C KE Y PR I M I T I V E S
In contrast to symmetric key primitives, public-key or asymmetric key
primitives provide some security properties such as: non-repudiation,
integrity protection, authentication, confidentiality and key exchange
without previously established symmetric secret keys.
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Algorithm Area(GE) Output Speed Technology
size (Kbps)* (µm)
AKARI1A [54] 476 16 24.24 0.09
Mandal et al[55] 1,242 16 13.8 -
LAMED [53] 1,566 16 17 -
Table 5: Lightweight Pseudo random number generator functions.
∗ Speed is given for a clock frequency of 100 kHz.
RSA encryption as the most well-known public key algorithm has
been widely used in various applications. But, due to computationally
intensive operations and high memory consumption, it is currently
not feasible to implement RSA for a low-cost RFID tags. This problem
for the similar public key primitives such as ElGamal [62] and DSA
(Digital Signature Algorithm) [63] which exploit exponential operations.
However, these primitives can be suitable to be implemented on high-
cost RFIDs with microprocessors (e.g. smart cards) or even with built-in
cryptographic coprocessor.
On the other hand, there are some advantages in public key primitives
which motivate the realizing public-key primitives on RFID tags. For
example, by utilizing public key algorithms one can make the tags
more resistant against counterfeiting and provide them with high level
of privacy (strong privacy) [64]. Researchers have most recently been
working on the feasibility of public-key algorithms for RFID tags [56,
58, 59], plus have developed Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC) [57, 60],
Hyper Elliptic Curve Cryptography (HECC) [65] and NTRU [57] for
RFID.
Recently, a hybrid Rabin-based public key encryption cryptosystem
called BlueJay [66] has been proposed. BlueJay is a combination of the
Hummingbird-2 [44] lightweight authenticated encryption algorithm
and Passerine [67] optimized for a 1024-bit public modulus n and 32-bit
register size. In Table 6, some of the latest results in the implementation
of public key primitives are presented. It should be noted that there
are many lightweight implementations of ECC regarding the field
size. For example a lightweight implementation of 163-bit (F2163) ECC
in [61] which is compliant with ISO 15693 and ISO 18000-3. The tag
using this implementation is now available in industry mainly for anti-
counterfeiting. ECC is also a candidate as a lightweight asymmetric
(public key) primitive in the ISO/IEC 29192-4.
25
Security Analysis of Lightweight Schemes for RFIDs
Algorithm Area Perf.∗ Technology Parameters
(GE) (ms) (µm)
BlueJay [57] ≤ 3,000 - 0.18 n = 1024, w = 32
NTRU [57] 3,000 58.45 0.18 N = 167, p = 3, q = 128
ECC [60] 8,104 115 0.18 F2131 , d = 4
HECC [65] 14,500 456 0.13 F267 , d = 8
Table 6: Lightweight public key primitives.
∗ Speed is given for a clock frequency of 500 kHz.
4.2 L I G H T W E I G H T PR O TO C O L S
The lightweight primitives presented in the previous section are uti-
lized by the lightweight protocols to provide low-cost RFID systems
with some properties. The main properties are: identification, authentica-
tion, as basic properties, and delegation and restriction, proof of existence
and distance bounding as additional properties [2]. These properties are
briefly introduced in this section.
• Identification: Identification in RFID systems is the process of
identifying tags by readers via some identification information
such as ID. Identification can be performed without using any
secret information. Therefore, no cryptographic techniques are
needed to provide identification. This property is fulfilled by the
identification protocols (Section 4.2.1).
• Authentication: As the communication between tags and readers
takes place in an open environment via RF signals, there should
be a mechanism for both side to ensure validity and authenticity
of the messages. This mechanism is called authentication. In
contrast to identification, some secret information is needed for
authentication. Some proposals for authentication in low-cost
RFID tags are discussed in Section 4.2.2.
• Delegation and Restriction: The properties called delegation and
restriction mainly address the data ownership and partner data inte-
gration challenge discussed in Section2.5. It happens when a tag’s
owner changes and the data corresponding to the tag is trans-
ferred to a new owner. This should be done while the current
owner would not be able to trace the tag any more. The proto-
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cols which are designed to address this issue are called ownership
transfer protocols discussed in Section 4.2.5.
• Proof of Existence: Proof of existence guarantees that a particular
tag exists in a specific location, at a specific time or with other
particular tags. The proposals address this issue, which are called
yoking/grouping proof protocols in the literature, along with some
application of this property are discussed in more details in Sec-
tion 4.2.3.
• Distance Bounding: To raise the security level of RFID systems
against the relay attack described in Section 3.2, the accepted dis-
tance between any tag and reader must be limited or bounded.
Distance bounding techniques are well-known solutions for this
purpose. These techniques limit the accepted distance between
a tag and a reader by measuring the round trip time of the ex-
changed messages between them and putting some limitations on
the round trip time. The distance bounding proposals for low-cost
RFID systems, called distance bounding protocols, are described in
Section 4.2.4.
It should be noted that all the protocols presented in this section except
the distance bounding protocols are executed in the application layer
according to the ISO/OSI reference model described in Section 2.1.4.
But the distance bounding protocols are executed in the physical layer.
4 .2 .1 ID E N T I F I C AT I O N PR O TO C O L S
A reader in passive RFID systems initiates the interrogations by broad-
casting a Query message. If there is only one tag in the neighborhood
or only one tag responds to this query, the identification is straightfor-
ward. But if more tags respond, the responses collide and thus cannot
be correctly received by the reader and so, the identification process
fails. The same thing (collision) may happen when one tag responds
to the queries of multiple readers in the neighborhood. An effective
technique to avoid this collision is using an anti-collision protocols in
the identification process.
The proposed protocols for tag collision resolution in RFID sys-
tems are either probabilistic or deterministic. Probabilistic anti-collision
schemes are mainly Aloha-based protocols which some of them can be
found in [75–78]. While deterministic protocols are mostly tree-based
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[79–82]. There are also some protocols with hybrid approaches [83, 84]
which use randomization in tree-based schemes.
Aloha-based protocols use a time division technique for data trans-
mission i.e. each RFID tag determines a distinct time slot and transmits
data in that time slot to avoid collisions. EPCglobal Class 1 Generation
2 exploits a variant of this type.
However, in tree-based protocols, all tags transmit their identification
data simultaneously. But if collision occurs, the anti-collision mechanism
based on binary tree or binary search tree structure is invoked within the
reader.
4 .2 .2 AU T H E N T I C AT I O N PR O TO C O L S
Authentication protocols are extensively discussed in the literature
in different forms. But one can categorize them in four major classes
regarding the fundamental elements used in them: protocols based on
cryptographic primitives, protocols based on ultra lightweight operations,
protocols based on the capabilities of EPCglobal Class1 Generation2 and
protocols based on the notion of physical primitives.
Among the proposals based on cryptographic primitives, the proto-
cols using hash functions or MACs (Message Authentication Codes)
are among the first solutions discussed in the literature [85–87]. There
are also some protocols based on PRNGs (Pseudo Random Numbers
Generators) [94, 95], stream ciphers [89], block ciphers [88] and even
public keys [90–93].
On the other hand, protocols based on ultra-lightweight operations
attempt to provide authentication without using cryptographic primi-
tives, and involve only simple bitwise and modular arithmetic on-tag
operations (e.g. XOR, AND, OR, rotation, etc.). The proposals of this
kind are divided into two major groups: protocols based on “minimalist
cryptography” and protocols based on NP-hard mathematical problems.
The set of authentication schemes presented as the MAP-family
(LMAP, EMAP, M2AP, etc) [97–99] and later on SASI [101] and Gos-
samer [102] protocols are inspired by the work minimalist cryptography
for low-cost RFID tags [100] in which an ultra lightweight protocol for
mutual authentication between tags and readers based on one-time
authenticators is suggested. From this category, the SASI protocol is de-
picted in Figure 8. The most famous class of lightweight authentication
protocols based on NP-hard mathematical problems is the HB family
authentication protocols. The HB authentication protocol proposed by
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Reader Tag
K1, K2, ID, IDS K1, K2, ID, IDS
Authentication
Hello−−−−−−−−−−−→
IDS←−−−−−−−−−−−
n1, n2 ∈R
A = IDS⊕ K1 ⊕ n1
B = (IDS ∨ K2) + n2
K¯1 = ROT(n2 ⊕ K1, K1)
K¯2 = ROT(n1 ⊕ K2, K2)
C = (K1 ⊕ K¯2) + (K2 ⊕ K¯1)
A,B,C
−−−−−−−−−−−→
Extract n1 from A.
Extract n2 from B.
Verify C.
D = (K˜2 + ID)⊕
((K1 ⊕ K2) ∨ K¯1)
D←−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify D.
Key Update
Both sides update their parameters as following:
Knew1 = K¯1
Knew2 = K¯2
IDSnew = (IDS + ID)⊕ (nn ⊕ K¯1)
Fig. 8: SASI ultra lightweight protocol
Hopper and Blum in 2001 [103](Fig.9) is the first member of this family.
This protocol aims at unilateral authenticating of an RFID tag to a reader
only by lightweight operations. From one perspective, the operations
used in this protocol are one matrix multiplication and some XORs. In
addition, the security of this algorithm and some others in this family
against passive attacks is reduced to a well-known NP-hard problem
called Learning with Parity Noise (LPN) problem [104]. The other mem-
bers of this family emerged as a result of proposing an attack on the
previous one in order to eliminate the weaknesses and render the prior
proposed attacks ineffective. Some of other members of this family are:
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Specifications
−r, η, e:Public parameters.
−ν¯ : r-bit noise vector where: Prob(νi = 1) = η, i = 1, ..., r
Reader Tag
x¯ ∈ {0, 1}k x¯ ∈ {0, 1}k
A¯k×r ∈R {0, 1}k×r
A¯−−−−−−−−−−−→
z¯ = (x¯⊗ A¯)⊕ ν¯
z¯←−−−−−−−−−−−
Check Hwt(z¯⊕ (x¯⊗ A¯)) ≤ er
Fig. 9: Parallelized version of an r-round HB protocol
HB+ [105], HB++ [106], HB* [107], HB-MP [108], HB] [109] and NLHB
[110].
As a possible alternative to HB-family protocols, another class of
authentication protocols, called CKK or in general (n, k, L), were intro-
duced in [111]. (n, k, L)-protocols have the advantage that fewer bits
need be communicated in comparison to HB-type protocols, and the
memory and computational requirements are lower at the tag and
appear to be more resistant to active attacks. The security of (n, k, L)-
protocols can be related to the hardness of a certain learning problem,
in this case the Learning Unions of L linear subspaces (LULS) problem
[112, 113].
The third category of authentication protocols consists of the schemes
designed for conforming to EPCGlobal Class1 Generation2 standard
[114–117]. These schemes mainly exploit the 16-bit CRC and 16-bit RNG
of the standard to provide authentication.
In the protocols based on physical primitives, some properties related
to the electronic circuits in RFID tags are exploited to form a primitive
to be used in the authentication protocols. One of the most prominent
proposals of this kind is Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). Some
authentication protocols based on PUFs are presented in [118–120].
4 .2 .3 YO K I N G/GR O U P I N G PR O O F PR O TO C O L S
In 2004, Juels [121] proposed a new security notion called Yoking Proof.
The yoking proof enables the generation of a proof which shows that a
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pair of RFID tags are scanned simultaneously by a reader. Yoking proof
are later generalized to grouping proofs which indicates that multiple
tags participate in the generation of the proof [122, 124].
By adopting grouping proofs, the manufacturer can prove to its cus-
tomers that the referred products are sold at the same time. For example
in a pharmacy store, some drugs must be sold according to the recipe.
For inpatients, the medical staffs can guarantee the authentication and
integrity of a group of medical items like inpatient bracelets and the con-
tainers of drugs [123]. For car industry, a grouping proof ensures that
all components of a car are assembled in the same factory [121, 125].
In Figure 10, the yoking proof protocol proposed by Juels is depicted.
The reader initiates the interrogation with the left tag (TA and secret
key kA) by sending “start left”. Then, TA calculates the keyed hash ( f )
of its internal counter cA and sends the tuple a = (cA, A, mA) back to
the reader. The reader initiates the interrogation with the tag on the
right (TB and secret key kA) by sending it “start right” concatenated
with a. TB computes mB = MACkB(a, cB), where cB is the internal
counter of TB and sends the tuple b = (B, mB, cB) to the reader and
increase its internal counter by one. The reader sends b to TA and
receives mAB = MACkA(a, b) in return. The yoking proof is calculated
as follows:
PAB = (A, B, cA, cB, mAB)
In this way, a verifier (e.g. the database), who has access to the secret key
of both tags and given the proof PAB, is able to verify the correctness of
the proof by calculating a′ and b′,
a′ = (A, cA, fkA(cA))
b′ = (B, cB, MACkB(a
′, cB))
and subsequently checks the equality mAB = MACkA(a
′, b′). Group-
ing proof protocols mainly address the tags sequentially. But in order
to make the schemes more practical, Lien et al. [127] suggested scan-
ning tags in parallel instead of in a sequential way. Since then, several
schemes have been proposed to improve the efficiency of grouping
proofs such as [126, 128].
Most of the grouping proof protocols in the literature are based on a
hash function or a MAC or they conform to EPC Class-1 Generation2
low-cost RFID tag capabilities. However, there are also some grouping
proof protocols based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC) [129].
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Tag A Reader Tag B
kA kB
“start left”←−−−−−−−−−−−
mA = fkA(cA)
a=(cA ,A,mA)−−−−−−−−−−−→
“start right”,a
−−−−−−−−−−−→
mB = MACkB(a, cB)
cB ← cB + 1
b=(B,mB ,cB)←−−−−−−−−−−−
b←−−−−−−−−−−−
mAB = MACkA(a, b)
cA ← cA + 1
mAB−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 10: Juels’s Yoking proof protocol
4.2 .4 D I S TA N C E BO U N D I N G PR O TO C O L S
Although many schemes have been proposed to secure RFID systems,
most of them are still susceptible to relay attack or other different attacks
related to locations. These attacks (see Section 5.1) aim at suggesting
a wrong assumption of the distance between a tag and a reader and
require simpler technical resources than tampering or cryptanalysis, and
they cannot be prevented by other lightweight protocols that operate
in the application layer. The main countermeasure against these attacks
is the use of distance bounding protocols, which verify not only that the
tag knows the cryptographic secret, but also that is within a certain
distance. To achieve this goal, distance bounding protocols must be
tightly integrated into the physical layer [130].
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In 1993, Brands and Chaum proposed the first distance bounding
protocol [134]. Afterward, in 2005, Hancke and Kuhn [135] proposed
the first distance-bounding protocol dedicated to RFID systems.
So far, there have been many schemes proposed either similar to
Hancke and Kuhn [131, 136, 139–141] or with different structures [134,
137, 138, 142, 143]. However, they mostly have something in common;
they all consist of two major parts: a slow phase in the beginning followed
by a fast phase or rapid bit exchange phase. In the fast phase, the round
trip time (RTT) of a bitwise challenge and response is measured to
estimate the distance i.e. a reader is able to calculate the distance of a
tag (d) [8]:
d = c× (∆t− td)
2
; ∆t = 2tp + td (2)
where, c is the propagation speed of light, tp is the one-way propagation
time , ∆t is the total elapsed RTT and td is the processing delay of the
tag.
The Hancke and Kuhn protocol is illustrated in Figure 11. In the first
slow phase, the tag and the reader generates a random number each
(NT and NR respectively) and exchange their random numbers. Then,
the reader and the tag compute the hash value H = hk(NR, NT) which
is of length 2n, where n is a security parameter and assign the first
n-bit to ν0 and the second n-bit to ν1. In the ith round of the fast phase,
the reader chooses a random challenge bit ci and sends it to the tag.
The tag responds with ν0i . The fast phase is performed for n rounds. It
should be noted that in some schemes, there is a third part called slow
phase-II, which has the role of the final phase or signature. Both slow
phases consist of the time-consuming operations such as random nonce
generations, commitment and signature calculations. On the other hand,
the fast phase includes non-time consuming response generations and
rapid bit exchanges. In order to decrease the adversary success proba-
bility of distance bounding protocols, Munilla and Peinado introduced
the concept of void challenges in [146]. Such challenges may be 0, 1, or
void, and the reader and tag agree on those challenges that should be
void - void means that no challenge is sent [132]. Some modifications
of this idea are introduced recently using non-uniform [143] or mixed
challenges [147]. The idea is that the challenges from the reader to the
tag in the fast bit exchanges are divided into two categories, random
challenges and predefined challenges. The former are random bits from
the reader and the latter are predefined bits known to both the reader
and the tag in advance [8].
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Reader Tag
k k
NR ∈R
NR−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ∈R
NT←−−−−−−−−−−−
H = hk(NR, NT) H = hk(NR, NT)
ν0 = H1...Hn ν0 = H1...Hn
ν1 = Hn+1...H2n ν1 = Hn+1...H2n
Start of fast phase
for i = 1...n
ci ∈ {0, 1}
start clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−→
ri = νci
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−
stop clock
Compute ∆ti
Check ∆ti ≤ tmax
End of fast phase
Fig. 11: Hancke and Kuhn’s Distance Bounding Protocol
One of the well-known schemes which consists of a final signature
is the Swiss-knife protocol [137] proposed by Kim et al. This protocol
attempts not only to resists location related attacks but also tackle the
problem of noisy channels by using an error resistance mechanism. As it
can be seen in Figure 12, the tag chooses a random NT and computes a
temporary key a = fk(CT , NT) using its permanent secret key k and NT
(here CT is just a system-wide constant). The tag splits its permanent
secret key k in two shares by computing R0 = a ,R1 = a ⊕ k. After
this first slow phase, the rapid bit exchange phase starts. This phase
is repeated n times and the challenge-response delay is measured for
each step. But in fact channel errors might occur (either randomly or
by action of the attacker) in this phase. Therefore, the challenges and
responses are denoted differently (ci, c′i and ri, r
′
i) at each side of the
channel to consider possible noise occurrence. The tag answers by
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Reader Tag
k, ID k, ID
NR ∈R {0, 1}n
NR−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ∈R {0, 1}n
a = fk(NT , CT){
R0 = a
R1 = a⊕ x
NT←−−−−−−−−−−−
Start of fast phase
for i = 1...n
ci ∈R {0, 1}
start clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−→
r′i = R
c′i
i
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−
stop clock
Compute ∆ti
End of fast phase
sT = fx(ID, NR,
NT , c′1, ..., c
′
n)
sT←−−−−−−−−−−−
Check ID in the Database
Compute R0, R1
errc = #{i : ci 6= c′i}
errr = #{i : ci = c′i, ri 6= Rcii }
errt = #{i : ci = c′i,∆ti > tmax}
if errc + errr + errt ≥ τ
REJECT
else
sR = fx(NT)
sR−−−−−−−−−−−→
Compute and
Compare tA
Fig. 12: Swiss knife Distance Bounding
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r′i = Rc′i . After the rapid bit exchange phase, the final phase (slow
phase II) begins. In this phase, messages sT and sR are transmitted from
the tag and the reader as a signature respectively. The reader is able
to calculate the values R0 and R1 by looking up the tags’s information
in the back-end and then checks the validity of the responses made
during rapid bit exchange phase. To render the scheme more resistant
against the noise or errors in the channel, the reader computes three
kinds of errors (errc, errr and errt) and compare their summation with
a predefined threshold τ. The reader continues the protocol unless the
summation exceeds the threshold.
4 .2 .5 TA G OW N E R S H I P TR A N S F E R PR O TO C O L S
It is usually the case that the RFID tag changes owner many times
during its life, and therefore one requires to manage the transfer of
ownership, where the tag information must be transferred to the new
owner. It is required that the current/old owner cannot track the tag
after the transfer of ownership. In this context the idea of ownership
transfer protocols is introduced, providing a solution to the requirement
to transfer the tag’s information in a secure and private way [150].
In ownership transfer protocols, there are mainly three active entities
involved: current/old owner, tag and new owner. The owners in an own-
ership transfer protocols are some readers in practice which take the
role of ownership in these kinds of protocols.
Most of the ownership transfer protocols consist of two phases, an
authentication phase and an ownership transfer phase. By the former phase,
the tag and two owners are mutually authenticated and the latter phase
assures all three entities that the ownership of the tag is transferred
securely.
The proposed protocols for ownership transfer protocols are divided
into two groups. Some protocols exploit a trusted third party (TTP)
which acts as a secure channel to transfer some information between
the entities. One of the first solution of this kind was proposed by Saito
et al [148, 149].
In Figure 13, the Saito et al’s ownership transfer protocol is illustrated.
This protocol is among the first and simplest protocols of this kind
and therefore not very secure. In this protocol, the secret sn is shared
between the current owner and the tag is updated to a new secret sn+1,
which is shared between the new owner and the tag.
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Current New Tag
Owner Owner
sn sn+1 sn
sn−−−−−−−−−−−→
Query
−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ∈R
NT←−−−−−−−−−−−
fNT (sn ,sn+1)−−−−−−−−−−−→
Extract sn, sn+1
If sn is correct:
sn ← sn+1
Fig. 13: Saito et al’s ownership transfer phase
There also exist some decentralized proposals without using a TTP.
Most of these schemes have two following assumptions. It is assumed
that there is a secure channel between the current and new owner to
pass the tag’s information securely. It is also assumed that the new
owner and the tag will be able to execute an authentication session in
an isolated environment without presence of the current owner after
the ownership transfer is completed in order to update some secret
parameters [151–154].
5 SE C U R I T Y AN A LY S I S O F L I G H T W E I G H T SC H E M E S
Security analysis of a scheme can be done in three steps:
1. Defining the security requirements and security margins of the
scheme.
2. Defining the adversarial capabilities and the adversarial model.
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3. Searching to find an attacking scenario which exploits the adver-
sarial capabilities to violate the security requirements with less
computational overhead than the security margins.
If the last step of the security analysis is successful, we can conclude
that the scheme lacks security or in other worlds, it is vulnerable against
attacks. But there is an underlying bottle neck at the third step of this
security analysis process; Searching to find effective attacking scenarios
can be heuristic and therefore, if it is not successful, we can not conclude
that the scheme is robust. To avoid this problem, formalization of the
analysis is a good starting point.
In this section, we study how the security of a lightweight scheme
can be analyzed. To do so, we first present some security requirements
and potential attacking scenarios for lightweight schemes. Then, we
briefly present some of the formal adversarial models in the literature,
which implies the capabilities of adversaries to attack the schemes.
5 .1 PR I VA C Y A N D SE C U R I T Y RE Q U I R E M E N T S
As mentioned in Section 4, there is always a trade-off among perfor-
mance, cost and security. This implies that for lightweight schemes
which are designed for low-cost RFID tags, it is not fair to expect the
same security and performance as the conventional ones.
>From security perspective, loosing the security bounds can be an
option. This can be achievable in two ways: lowering the desirable
security margins or limiting adversarial capabilities.
5 .1 .1 RE Q U I R E M E N T S F O R L I G H T W E I G H T PR I M I T I V E S
The security requirements of the lightweight primitives are almost the
same as the conventional primitives, which are extensively discussed in
the cryptography literature. The main differences between the security
requirements of the lightweight primitives and conventional primitives
are twofold:
1. The desired security margin for lightweight primitives is 280 in-
stead of 2128 which is more common in conventional primitives.
2. The related-key attack and the side channel attacks (e.g. fault attack)
are arguable as adversarial capabilities.
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5.1 .2 RE Q U I R E M E N T S F O R L I G H T W E I G H T PR O TO C O L S
Lightweight protocols should fulfill some security and privacy require-
ments. In this section, we first study the general requirements which
are common for all types of lightweight protocols and then, we present
some requirements which are specific for each type.
The same as lightweight primitives, there are some commonsense in
the security analysis of the lightweight protocols:
1. Passive attacks which only exploit the information collected via
eavesdropping are more welcome.
2. Attacking the lightweight protocols specially those with ultra
lightweight operations via tampering or some other side channel
attacks is still arguable.
As mentioned earlier, the most important requirements of lightweight
protocols are to preserve privacy which consists of two parts:
• Resistant against tag information leakage: the sensitive information
of the tag should not be leaked or revealed to an unauthorized
reader.
• Resistant against tag tracking: It should be impossible for an adver-
sary to track or distinguish a specific tag by just having its output.
As an extension of the second requirement, there is a property
called forward security. Forward security is defined as follows:
if the secret information in a tag becomes known to an adver-
sary, e.g. via tampering, the past outputs of the tag should remain
indistinguishable.
There are also some general security requirements for the lightweight
protocols such as resistance against the following attacks [150]:
• Tag impersonation: In this attack, an adversary can impersonate
a tag without knowing the tag’s secret information in advance.
Thus, it can communicate with a reader instead of the tag and be
authenticated as the tag.
• Replay attacks : In this attack, an adversary can intercept messages
exchanged between a reader and a tag, and replay them.
• Man-in-the-middle attacks: In this attack, an adversary can insert or
modify messages sent between a reader and a tag without being
detected.
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• Denial-of-service attacks : In this attack, an adversary can interrupt
or impede messages sent between a reader and a tag. Such an
attack can cause desynchronization between the tag and the other
components of the system.
Some of the lightweight protocols need some extra requirements to
meet, e.g. yoking/grouping proof protocols need to resist even in the
following situations [129]:
• Compromised tag : In this situation, the tag is compromised but the
reader is non-compromised.
• Colluding reader and tag : In this situation, the reader and one of
the tags are compromised.
• Colluding tags : In this situation, the reader is not compromised
but both/a group of tags are compromised. In this situation, the
compromised tags can exchange some messages in advance (e.g.,
via another reader), but do not know each other’s private key.
Distance bounding protocols need also to resist against the following
attacks [144]:
• Distance Fraud: A distance fraud is an attack where a dishonest
and lonely tag purports to be in the neighborhood of the reader.
• Mafia Fraud(relay attack): A mafia fraud is an attack where an
adversary defeats a distance bounding protocol using a an-in-the-
middle between the reader and an honest tag located outside the
neighborhood.
• Terrorist Fraud: A terrorist fraud is an attack where an adversary
defeats a distance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle
between the reader and a dishonest tag located outside of the
neighborhood, such that the latter actively helps the adversary
to maximize her attack success probability, without giving to her
any advantage for future attacks.
Figure 14 illustrates these attacks regarding the position of the adversary.
The T∗ and R∗ represent the adversary in the role of a tag or a reader
respectively.
In addition to the general requirements mentioned earlier, the owner-
ship transfer protocols should fulfill the following requirements [155]:
40
RT*
R
T*=T
R
R*
T
T*
T
R
T*
Fig. 14: From left to right: Impersonation Fraud, Distance Fraud, Mafia and Terrorist
Fraud [144].
• Previous owner privacy: No future owners should be able to relate
or trace back any previous communication between the previous
owner and the RFID tag even though a full history of transmitted
messages is eavesdropped and recorded.
• New owner privacy: No previous owners should be able to relate or
track any current communication between the new owner and the
RFID tag even though all the transmission is being eavesdropped.
There are also some other optional requirements for ownership transfer
protocols in the literature [155]:
• Controlled delegation: The current owner of the RFID tag should
have the authority to temporary delegate the access right of the
tag to anyone without forfeiting the ownership to the tag. The
delegate cannot overtake the ownership while the owner can
cancel this delegation at anytime. Moreover, the delegation will
automatically expire once a pre-determined number of queries
value is reached.
• Temporary authorization recovery: The current owner of the RFID
tag should be able to allow the previous owner to gain back the
access to the RFID tag without going through another instance
of the ownership transfer protocol. At the same time, the current
owner can cancel the recovered authorization at anytime without
the help from the previous owner.
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• Tag assurance: During the ownership transfer scheme, the buyer
should be able to be assured that the RFID tag undergoes the
ownership transfer is the tag claimed by the current owner and
requested by the buyer. This property guarantees that the current
owner cannot randomly pick any tagged product he/she owns
and sells it to the buyer.
• Current ownership proof : The current owner should be able to prove
to any third party that he/she is the current owner of the RFID
tagged item.
• Undeniable ownership transfer : The current owner should be able
to prove to any third party that the RFID tagged item was owned
by a previous owner and the previous owner cannot deny ever
owning the tag.
• Owner initiation: The current owner and only the current owner
should be able to initiate an ownership transfer, key change and
delegation.
5 .2 AD V E R S A R I A L MO D E L S
In this section, we explore two formal adversarial models which attempt
to model the adversarial capabilities to attack the lightweight protocols’
security requirements. In Subsections 5.3.2 the model mainly addresses
the privacy requirement and it is mostly used to analyze the lightweight
authentication protocols. The privacy models of this kind have been
extensively studied in the literature, some of the well-known models
of this kind are: Avoine’s model [156], Juels-Weis’s et al’s model [64],
Vuadenay’s model [158] and Herman et al’s model [157].
Furthermore, in Subsection 5.3.3, a formal framework for analyz-
ing the security of distance bounding protocols is studied. It should
be noted that there are some other formal models for other kinds of
lightweight protocols such as ownership transfer protocols [160].
5 .2 .1 NO TAT I O N S
We will denote T as a tag, R as the reader and A as the adversary. A
tag T is able to communicate with R, when it enters into R’s electro-
magnetic field. Then both reader and tag can participate together to a
protocol instance pi.
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5.3 AD V E R S A R I A L MO D E L S
In this section, we explore two formal adversarial models which model
the adversarial capabilities to attack the lightweight protocols’ secu-
rity requirements. In Subsection 5.3.2 the model mainly addresses the
privacy requirement and it is mostly used to analyze the lightweight
authentication protocols. The privacy models of this kind have been
extensively studied in the literature, some of the well-known models
of this kind are: Avoine’s model [156], Juels-Weis’s et al’s model [64],
Vuadenay’s model [158] and Herman et al’s model [157].
Furthermore, in Subsection 5.3.3, a formal framework for analyzing
the security of distance bounding protocols is studied. It should be
noted that there is also a formal approach to distance-bounding RFID
protocols introduced in [145]. This approach gives rigorous crypto-
graphic security models for mafia, terrorist, and distance frauds in
distance-bounding protocols.
It should be noted that there are some other formal models for other
kinds of lightweight protocols such as ownership transfer protocols
[160].
5 .3 .1 NO TAT I O N S
We will denote T as a tag, R as a reader and A as an adversary. A T is
able to communicate with R, when it enters into R’s electromagnetic
field. Then, both reader and tag can participate together to a protocol
instance pi.
5 .3 .2 HE R M A N E A L’S MO D E L
Hermans, Pashalidis, Vercauteren and Preneel present a model based on
indistinguishability [157] between two “worlds”: it is most commonly
called the “left or right” paradigm. This model is mainly inspired by
Vaudanay’s model.
In this model, the adversary A is able to interacts with the challenger
by means of the following oracles:
• CreateTag(ID)→ Ti: on input a tag identifier ID, this oracle regis-
ters the new tag with the server.
• Launch→ (pi, m): this oracle launches a new protocol run, accord-
ing to the protocol specifications. It returns a session identifier pi,
generated by the reader, together with the first message m that
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the reader sends. Note that this implies that this model does not
support tag-initiated protocols.
• DrawTag(Ti, Tj) → vtag: on input a pair of tag references, this
oracle generates a virtual tag reference, as a monotonic counter,
vtag and stores the triple Ti, Tj, vtag in a table D. Depending on
the value of b, vtag either refers to Ti or Tj.
• Free(vtag)b: on input vtag, this oracle retrieves the triple (vtag, Ti, Tj)
from the table Tab. If b = 0, it resets the tag Ti. Otherwise, it resets
the tag Tj. Then it removes the entry (vtag, Ti, Tj) from D.
• SendTag(vtag, m)b → m′: on input vtag, this oracle retrieves the
triple (vtag, Ti, Tj) from the table D and sends the message m to
either Ti (if b = 0) or Tj (if b = 1). It returns the reply from the
tag (m′).
• SendReader(pi, m)→ m′: on input pi, m this oracle sends the mes-
sage m to the reader in session pi and returns the reply m′ from
the reader is returned by the oracle.
• Result(pi): on input pi, this oracle returns a bit indicating whether
or not the reader accepted session pi as a protocol run that resulted
in successful authentication of a tag.
• Corrupt(Ti): on input a tag reference Ti, this oracle returns the
complete internal state of Ti. Note that the adversary is not given
control over Ti.
The same as Vaudanay, Hermans et al divide adversaries into different
classes, depending on restrictions regarding their use of the above the
oracles. In particular, a strong adversary may use all eight oracles with-
out any restrictions. A destructive adversary is not allowed to use a tag
after it has been corrupted. This models situations where corrupting a
tag leads to the destruction of the tag. A forward adversary can only do
other corruptions after the first corruption. That is, no protocol interac-
tions are allowed after the first corrupt. A weak adversary does not have
the ability to corrupt tags. Orthogonal to these four attacker classes
there is the notion of wide and narrow adversary. A wide adversary
has access to the result of the verification by the server while a narrow
adversary does not. Due to their generality, the above restrictions can
be used perfectly in other privacy models.
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The attacking scenario using this model for a specific class of adver-
sary, P, is as follows.
1. The challenger initializes the system, chooses a bit b at random
presents to the adversary the system where b refers to either the
“left” tags Ti (if b = 0) or the right tags Tj (if b = 1).
2. A interacts with the whole system, limited by her class P.
3. A outputs a guess bit b′.
A We say that A wins the privacy game if and only if g = b, i.e. if it
correctly identifies which of the worlds was active. The advantage of
the adversary is defined as:
AdvA(k) = |Pr(b′ = b|b = 0) + Pr(b′ = b|b = 1)− 1| < e
5.3 .3 AV O I N E et al’S MO D E L F O R D I S TA N C E BO U N D I N G
In this section, a brief overview of Avoine et al’s framework [144] for
analyzing distance bounding protocol is given.
The adversary model which has been used in the model is the Dolev-
Yao model [161]. In this model, the adversary can provoke or manipulate
the communication between two parties where manipulating the com-
munication means relay, withhold, or insert messages and she is only
limited by the constraints of the cryptographic methods used. However,
she cannot perform unbounded computations and cannot obtain the
keys of honest parties. The latter assumption is not considered for the
distance fraud attacks, where the tag has access to the keys.
The main attacking scenarios to target distance bounding protocols
are : distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud which are explained
in Section 5.1.2. But the adversary can apply these attacks using three
following strategies [144]:
1. Pre-ask strategy: The adversary relays the messages between the
reader and the tag in both slow phases of the protocol, and before
the honest reader starts the fast phase, executes the fast phase
with the honest tag. Having the responses from the honest tag,
the adversary carries on fast phase with the honest reader.
2. Post-ask strategy: The adversary relays the messages between the
reader and the tag in both slow phases of the protocol. Afterward,
she executes the fast phase with the honest reader without asking
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Fig. 15: Adversary’s location zones.
the tag. Then, she queries the tag with the correct challenges
received from the honest reader during the fast phase.
3. Early-reply strategy: In this strategy, the adversary, located outside
of the neighborhood, relays the first slow phase. During the fast
phase, her strategy is to anticipate the challenge and she replies
before she is supposed to do so. In this way, the adversary deceives
the verifier on his location.
Now, the distance of the adversary from the reader is studied. In the
distance fraud attack, depending on how far the adversary is from
the reader, she receives the challenges with some delay. This delay
may impact the probability of success of the attack. Considering this
determining factor, we use a modified version of the model described
in [132]. In this model, the adversary can communicate with the reader
from one of the spherical zones illustrated in Figure 15. For instance,
Z0 represents the legal authentication region with the diameter d0,
where the adversary accesses to all the challenges and produces valid
responses on time. The distance d0 is calculated by using (2) as:
d0 = c× (∆t− td)2 ; ∆t = 2tp + td (3)
where, c is the propagation speed of light, tp is the one-way propagation
time, ∆t is the total elapsed RTT and td is the processing delay of the
tag.
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When the adversary is located at Zl , any response from her takes
more time to get to the reader, namely
t′p = tp + δt; δt =
∑li=1 di
c
(4)
In order to have a successful attack, the adversary should send each
current response, at least 2δt before receiving the current challenge.
Moreover, the adversary located in Zl has access to the challenges up
to lth previous round before she generates the response of the current
round.
In the distance fraud, the capabilities of the tag as the adversary are
of great importance. Considering that whether the tag has full control
on the execution of the algorithm or not, we can have two different
tampering capability models for the tag, black-box and white-box.
• Black-box model: In a black-box model, the tag cannot observe or
tamper with the execution of the algorithm.
• White-box model: In a white-box model, the tag has full access to
the implementation of the algorithm and a complete control over
the execution environment.
In [144], it has been shown that the probability of success for an ad-
versary tag can be remarkably elevated is it has the capabilities in the
white-box model.
The model described in this section defines a framework for analyzing
the security of a distance bounding protocol against distance fraud,
mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. It should be noted that the
desired security margin of the distance bounding protocols against the
mentioned attacks is ( 12 )
n , where n is the number of challenge and
response iterations in the fast phase of the protocol. However, in [132],
the authors showed that there are some trade-offs between the security
margin of the distance bounding protocols against distance and mafia
fraud attacks, for some protocols without final signature. It implies that
the security margin against the distance fraud and mafia fraud can not
reach the desired bound simultaneously.
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6 SU M M A RY O F PA P E R S
This thesis consists of five papers. In the following sections, a short
overview of each paper is given.
6 .1 PA P E R I
The first paper, entitled “On the Security of Non-Linear HB (NLHB)
Protocol against Passive Attack” and was presented at IEEE/IFIP Inter-
national Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing (EUC- Trust-
Com 2010) in Hong Kong, China.
As a variant of the HB authentication protocol for RFID systems
presented in Section 4.2.2, which relies on the complexity of decoding
linear codes against passive attacks, Madhavan et al presented Non-
Linear HB (NLHB) protocol. In contrast to HB, NLHB relies on the
complexity of decoding a class of non-linear codes to render the passive
attacks proposed against HB ineffective. Based on the fact that there
has been no passive solution for the problem of decoding a random
non-linear code, the authors have claimed that NLHB’s security margin
is very close to its key size.
In this paper, we show that existing passive attacks against HB proto-
col can still be applicable to NLHB and this protocol does not provide
the desired security margin. In our attack, we first linearize the non-
linear part of NLHB to obtain a HB equivalent for NLHB, and then
exploit the passive attack techniques proposed for the HB to evaluate
the security margin of NLHB. The results show that although NLHB’s
security margin is relatively higher than HB against similar passive
attack techniques, it has been overestimated especially when the noise
vector in the protocol has a low weight.
6 .2 PA P E R I I
The second paper, entitled “Passive Cryptanalysis of the UnCondi-
tionally Secure Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems” and was
presented at International Conference on Information Security and Cryptol-
ogy (ICISC 2010) in Seoul, Korea.
Alomair et al. proposed the first UnConditionally Secure mutual au-
thentication protocol for low-cost RFID systems(UCS-RFID). The se-
curity of the UCS-RFID relies on five dynamic secret keys which are
updated at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce)
secretly transmitted from a reader to tags.
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Our results show that, at the highest security level of the protocol (se-
curity parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasible with the probability
of 0.99 by eavesdropping about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce
enables a passive attacker to recover all five secret keys of the protocol.
To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic attack in this paper.
Our attack recovers the secret keys with a probability that increases by
accessing more protocol runs. We also show that tracing a tag using this
protocol is also possible even with less runs of the protocol.
6 .3 PA P E R I I I
The third paper, entitled “Security Analysis of two Distance-Bounding
Protocols” and was presented at Workshop on RFID Security and Privacy
(RFIDSec 2011) in Amherst, Massachusetts, USA.
In this paper, we analyze the security of two recently proposed dis-
tance bounding protocols called the “Hitomi” and the “NUS” protocols.
Our results show that the claimed security of both protocols has been
overestimated. Namely, we show that the Hitomi protocol is susceptible
to a full secret key disclosure attack which not only results in violat-
ing the privacy of the protocol, but also can be exploited for further
attacks such as impersonation, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks.
Our results also demonstrates that the probability of success in a dis-
tance fraud attack against the NUS protocol can be increased up to
( 34 )
n and even slightly more, if the adversary is furnished with some
computational capabilities.
6 .4 PA P E R IV
The fourth paper, entitled “Colluding Tags Attack on the ECC-based
Grouping Proofs for RFIDs” and was presented at International Confer-
ence on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2011) in Seville, Spain.
A new privacy-preserving Elliptic Curve based grouping proof proto-
col with colluding tag prevention(CTP) has been proposed by Batina et al.
The notion of this protocol is mainly derived from the latest version of
an ECC-based authentication scheme called EC-RAC. The main security
concern for this as grouping proof protocols is to prevent forged proof
generation.
In this paper, we show that the CTP protocol is vulnerable to some
colluding tag attacking scenario. In our attack, the involved tags pass
some message to one specific tag to qualify it to represent them all in
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the grouping proof generation time without revealing any information
about their private keys.
In addition, we propose a new elliptic curve based grouping protocol
which can fix the problem. Our proposal is based on a formally proved
privacy preserving authentication protocol and has the advantage of
being resistant against colluding tags attacks with the same amount of
computation.
6 .5 PA P E R V
The fifth paper, entitled “On the Privacy of Two Tag Ownership Transfer
Protocols for RFIDs” and was presented at IEEE International Confer-
ence for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST2011) in Abu
Dhabi, UAE.
In this paper, the privacy of two recent RFID tag ownership transfer
protocols are investigated against the tag owners as adversaries. The
first protocol called ROTIV is a scheme which provides a privacy-
preserving ownership transfer by using an HMAC-based authentication
with public key encryption. However, our passive attack on this protocol
shows that any legitimate owner which has been the owner of a specific
tag is able to trace it either in the past or in the future. Tracing the tag
is also possible via an active attack for any adversary who is able to
tamper the tag and extract its information.
The second protocol called, Chen et al’s protocol, is an ownership
transfer protocol for passive RFID tags which conforms EPC Class1
Generation2 standard. Our attack on this protocol shows that the previ-
ous owners of a particular tag are able to trace it in future. Furthermore,
they are able even to obtain the tag’s secret information at any time in
the future which makes them capable of impersonating the tag.
7 FU T U R E RE S E A R C H
As mentioned earlier, public acceptance of RFIDs as an integral part
of “Internet of Things” depends on strong technical and operational
security and privacy solutions being in place. Although there have been
plenty of efforts to provide a desirable level of security and privacy for
RFIDs, there are still some missing pieces in the puzzle, e.g.:
• RFIDs still lack a standard which meets even a minimum level of
security and privacy in practice.
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• There is still not a unanimous agreement on the desirable security
level and requirements in the lightweight cryptography.
The researches have shown that deploying lightweight primitives is
possible on the RFID tags, even on the most constrained ones. There-
fore, if the security and practical requirements of the RFID systems
are clearly defined, the future trend of the research can be towards
designing secure lightweight primitives and correspondingly provable
lightweight protocols which not only meet the security but also the
practical requirements of RFID systems.
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Abstract. As a variant of the HB authentication protocol
for RFID systems, which relies on the complexity of de-
coding linear codes against passive attacks, Madhavan et
al. presented Non-Linear HB(NLHB) protocol. In contrast
to HB, NLHB relies on the complexity of decoding a class
of non-linear codes to render the passive attacks proposed
against HB ineffective. Based on the fact that there has been
no passive solution for the problem of decoding a random
non-linear code, the authors have claimed that NLHB’s se-
curity margin is very close to its key size.
In this paper, we show that passive attacks against HB
protocol can still be applicable to NLHB and this protocol
does not provide the desired security margin. In our attack,
we first linearize the non-linear part of NLHB to obtain a
HB equivalent for NLHB, and then exploit the passive attack
techniques proposed for the HB to evaluate the security
margin of NLHB. The results show that although NLHB’s
security margin is relatively higher than HB against similar
passive attack techniques, it has been overestimated and, in
contrary to what is claimed, NLHB is vulnerable to passive
attacks against HB, especially when the noise vector in the
protocol has a low weight.
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1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are forming the next gen-
eration technology for identifying objects, and are poised to supplant
barcodes in near future. Their advantages such as: more storage and
ease of use have caused a universal proliferation of RFID tags in many
commercial as well as national security applications; [1] ranging from
electronic passports [3, 4], contactless credit cards [2], to supply chain
management [5–7].
This widespread deployment of RFID tags has raised some concerns
about their security. On the other hand, RFID tag constraints in process-
ing power and memory make them tougher to deal with in security.
These kinds of constraints dictate a paradigm shift in security provision
for RFIDs which is known as lightweight cryptography.
Lightweight authentication protocol is a subset of lightweight cryp-
tography which tackles providing authentication in highly constrained
environments (e.g RFID systems) as well as security provision to a
reasonable extent [8, 9].
1 .1 NO TAT I O N S
• Ga×b: a× b binary matrix.
• h1×b: 1× b binary vector.
• A⊗ B: matrix multiplication of A and B.
• ⊕: XOR operation.
• xi: ith bit of binary vector x.
• Hwt(.): hamming weight function.
• h⊗ G: matrix multiplication of a vector h into matrix G.
• R, T: Reader and Tag respectively.
1 .2 HB FA M I LY PR O TO C O L S
The HB lightweight authentication protocol proposed by Hopper and
Blum in 2001 [10] is the first in the HB family of protocols. An overview
of a paralleled r-round of the HB protocol is given in Figure 1. This
protocol aims at unilateral authenticating of an RFID tag to a reader
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Specifications
−r, η, e:Public parameters.
−ν : d-bit noise vector where: Prob(νi = 1) = η, i = 1, ..., r
HB Protocol
- Secret parameter x ∈ {0, 1}k is shared between R and T.
(1) R : Chooses a random Ak×r matrix.
(2) R⇒ T : A
(3) T : Computes z1×r = (x⊗ A)⊕ ν1×r
(4) T ⇒ R : z
(5) R : ACCEPTS iff Hwt(z⊕ (x⊗ A) ≤ er)
Fig. 1: Parallelized version of an r-round HB protocol
only by lightweight operations. The operations used in this protocol
are one matrix multiplication and some XORs. On the other hand, The
security of this algorithm and some others in this family against passive
attacks is reduced to a well-known NP-hard problem called Learning
with Parity Noise (LPN) problem [11]. The other members of this family
emerged as a result of proposing an attack on the previous one in order
to eliminate the weaknesses and render the prior proposed attacks
ineffective. Some of other members of this family are: HB+ [12],HB++
[13], HB* [14],HB-MP [16],HB] [21] and NLHB [17]. Attacks which have
targeted these authentication protocols consists both passive [18–20]
and active types [21, 22]. In an active attack, the adversary is able to
eavesdrop the transcripts between a reader and a tag as well as being
able to interact with them and manipulate the messages exchanging in
between [23] in order to impersonate either of them. It should be noted
that active attacks involve a broad spectrum of attacks which differ
in adversary’s capabilities (e.g. DET [23] and GRS [21] attack models).
On the contrary, in a passive attack, the adversary has only access to
the transcripts from an arbitrary number of authentication sessions
between a tag and a reader and aims at impersonating either of them.
1 .3 LPN PR O B L E M
If we see from a passive adversary perspective, who has only access to s
number of parallelized r-round HB protocol transcripts(i.e. Ak×n, z1×n, η
where n = s× r) and his goal is to recover secret parameter x, it will
be obvious that she faces a decoding problem of a codeword (x⊗ A)
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generated by a random linear block code A in presence of noise ν [25].
This problem is called LPN problem with parameters k, n, η and has been
shown to be NP-hard in worst case [25].
1 .4 LPN SO LV E R S
In addition to worst case complexity results of the LPN problem, there
are numerous studies on average case complexity [20, 26]. These studies
has led to finding some algorithms to solve the LPN problem under
certain assumptions(LPN solvers). Proposition of these algorithms paved
the way for applying passive attack against some of HB family protocols.
In [20], the BKW algorithm has been reported which can be consid-
ered as an instance of the generalized birthday paradox [27]. In [18],
another algorithm(FMICM) has been proposed inspired by fast corre-
lation attack [24] on ciphers. The solution proposed by the FMICM
algorithm is under the assumption of having low bit rate( kn )and high η.
Besides some deterministic LPN solvers such as the two aforementioned
algorithms, there are some probabilistic algorithms such as CTIN [19]
which accomplish their goal even when the adversary has access to less
amount of transcripts comparing to deterministic ones.
As said, applying any passive attack on HB protocol requires to
utilize an LPN solver algorithm to solve the LPN problem. Thus, the
terms LPN solver and passive attack against HB protocol point to the
same notion and are used interchangeably hereafter.
Using LPN solvers caused a dramatic decrease in security margin
of some of HB family protocols against passive attacks [18, 19]. As an
attempt to search for a variant of the HB, which relies on the complexity
of decoding linear codes against passive attacks, Madhavan et al. pre-
sented Non-Linear HB(NLHB) protocol. In contrast to HB, NLHB relies
on the complexity of decoding a class of non-linear codes to render
the passive attacks proposed against HB ineffective. Based on this fact
that there has been no passive solution for the problem of decoding a
random non-linear code, the authors have claimed that NLHB’s security
margin is very close to its key size.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a passive attack on
the NLHB protocol. The idea of our attack is the linearization of the
non-linear part of the NLHB protocol to convert it to an equivalent of
conventional HB protocol. This method has been adopted in order to be
able to deploy the passive attack techniques used against HB on NLHB.
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Specifications
−r, η, p, e:Public parameters
−d = r− p
−ν : d-bit noise vector where: Prob(νi = 1) = η, i = 1, ..., d
NLHB Protocol
- Secret parameter x ∈ {0, 1}k is shared between R and T.
(1) R : Chooses a random Ak×r matrix.
(2) R⇒ T : A
(3) T : Computes z1×d = f (x⊗ A)⊕ ν1×d
(4) T ⇒ R : z
(5) R : ACCEPTS iff Hwt(z⊕ f (x⊗ A)) ≤ ed
Fig. 2: Parallelized version of an r-round NLHB protocol
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we give a brief description of the NLHB protocol and Section
3 elaborates on our attack method on it. In Section 4, we display the
results of applying our attack on NLHB compared to similar attacks on
HB and eventually, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 DE S C R I P T I O N O F T H E NLHB PR O TO C O L
Figure 2 shows one session of a parallelized r-round version of NLHB
protocol. The tag and reader share a k-bit secret x in advance. The
reader transmits a random k× r challenge matrix A to the tag. Having A
received, the tag computes f (x⊗ A). Subsequently, it also computes z =
f (x⊗ A)⊕ ν, where ν is a noise-vector whose bits are all independently
distributed according to the Bernoulli distribution with parameter η,
just like the noise vector in the HB protocol. x⊗ A is also an r-bit vector
similar to HB, but z differs in size. It is a d-bit vector(d = r − p). On
receiving z, the reader checks whether Hwt(z⊕ f (x⊗ A)) ≤ ed Where
0 < e < η < 0.5. If this is true, reader accepts and this means that the
tag has been authenticated successfully.
2 .1 FU N C T I O N f
The function f used in the protocol is a non-linear function which
maps {0, 1}r to {0, 1}d. Specifically, in [17], the function f is defined as
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p g
2 xi+1xi+2
3 xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+1xi+3
xi+1xi+3 ⊕ xi+2xi+3
xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 ⊕ xi+3xi+1
4 xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+3
xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+4 ⊕ xi+3xi+4
xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 ⊕ xi+3xi+4
Table 1: Proposed g function for NLHB protocol
following:
y = f (x); y ∈ {0, 1}d , x ∈ {0, 1}r (1)
and
yi = xi ⊕ g(xi+1, ..., xi+p) (2)
where g : {0, 1}p → {0, 1} is a non linear boolean function. The authors
have also proposed some specific functions for g corresponding to
parameter p to achieve maximum entropy and lower the complexity
of the protocol (see Table 1). In [17], the authors have shown that for a
general function of f , the existing passive attacks on the HB protocol
family (discussed in section 1.4) do not work on their protocol.
3 PR O P O S E D AT TA C K I N G ME T H O D
3.1 DE S C R I P T I O N
In this section, we present our three-phase passive attack on the NLHB
protocol. In this passive attack, we assume that the attacker has access
to n rounnds of the NLHB protocol where n = s× r (i.e. s sessions of
an r-round protocol) and thus can form matrix A according to (3).
Ak×n = (A1k×r|| . . . ||Ask×r) (3)
where Aik×r is random matrix in i
th session.
Exploiting the passive attack techniques proposed for the HB protocol,
we require to find an HB equivalent of the NLHB protocol. This implies
that we should first find a linear approximation of its non-linear part
and then update its parameters accordingly. Hence, phase I and II of
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p g ≈ g q
2 xi+1xi+2 xi+1 0.75
xi+2 0.75
3 xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+1xi+3 xi+1 0.75
xi+1xi+3 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 xi+3 0.75
xi+1xi+2 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 ⊕ xi+3xi+1 xi+2 0.75
4 xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 xi+1 0.62
xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+4 ⊕ xi+3xi+4 xi+4 0.75
xi+1xi+4 ⊕ xi+2xi+3 ⊕ xi+3xi+4 xi+2 ⊕ xi+3 ⊕ xi+4 ⊕ 1 0.75
Table 2: Best linear approximation of function g in NLHB protocol and their probabili-
ties
our attack tackle the former and latter implications and phase III is the
utilization of passive attack techniques on the equivalent HB protocol.
Phase I: Linearization
Our objective in this phase is to find a relatively good linear approxima-
tion for non-linear part of NLHB to convert the problem of decoding a
non-linear random code to LPN problem. To do so, we should find a
matrix B such that the probability q in (4) is relatively high.
prob( f (x⊗ A) = (x⊗ A)1×n ⊗ Bn×n∗) = q; n∗ = n− s× p (4)
To construct matrix B, we require to linearize the whole system and
according to (2), the non-linear part of the algorithm is the function
g which will be our target for linearization hereafter. We can use the
Walsh-Hadamard technique [28] to find the best linear approximation
for the boolean function g such that:
g(xi+1, ..., xi+p) ≈
i+p
∑
j=i+1
cjxj (5)
According to Table 2, all functions proposed for NLHB can be linearly
approximated with a relatively high probability. A linear approximation
of all g functions with their probabilities q are shown in Table 2. Having
cjs from linear approximation of g, we can conclude this phase by
calculating matrix B. Similar to matrix A in (3), matrix B for s sessions
has the following structure:
Bn×n∗ = (B1n×d|| . . . ||Bsn×d) (6)
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in which,
blij =

1 if i = j
cj for j = i+ 1, ..., i+ p
0 otherwise
(7)
where i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ..., n∗; l = 1, ..., s or,
Bln×d =

1 0 0
c1 1 0
c2 c1 0
... c2
...
cp
... . . .
0 cp 0
0 0 0
...
...
...
0 0 cp

; l = 1, ..., s (8)
Phase II: Finding a new linear equivalent protocol
In this phase, we attempt to find an equivalent HB protocol for NLHB
using the linear approximation obtained in previous phase. Since our
approximation is valid with probability q, we can rewrite (4) as follow-
ing to formulate the HB equivalent of our NLHB protocol with new
parameters denoted by ∗.
y = f (xA) = (x⊗ A)⊗ B⊕ e
= (x⊗ A∗)⊕ e (9)
where:
A∗k×n∗ = Ak×n ⊗ Bn×n∗
Prob(ei = 1) = (1− q); i = 1, ..., n∗ (10)
Now, by adding the noise of protocol to both side of (9) we have:
y = f (x⊗ A)⊕ ν = (x⊗ A∗)⊕ ν⊕ e = (x⊗ A∗)⊕ ν∗ (11)
where ν∗ = ν⊕ e.
As ν and e are independent, the probability of error for the new noise
vector can be calculated by (12).
Prob(ν∗i = 1) = η
∗ = Prob(νi = 1) + Prob(ei = 1)−
Prob(νi = 1)× Prob(ei = 1)
= η + (1− q)− (1− q)η. (12)
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As it is apparent from (12), the noise of the equivalent HB protocol(ν∗)
is more than the noise in NLHB protocol. Therefore, in general, the
NLHB protocol is more resistant against the passive attacks comparing
to the HB protocol with the same parameters. Nevertheless, according
to our results in Section 4, this strength is far lower than it has been
claimed and desired.
Phase III: Recovering secret parameter x
Up to here, we have accomplished to find an equivalent HB form for
the NLHB protocol. From now on, the problem of recovering secret
parameter x is an LPN problem with random matrix A∗ and parameters
k, n∗, η∗ (equivalent HB parameters) and therefore can be achieved by
using any of LPN solvers discussed in Section 1.4.
3 .2 CO M P L E X I T Y O F T H E AT TA C K
Complexity of our attack consists of three parts corresponding to each
phase. For phase I, we need to find the best linear approximation for
boolean function g with p variables. This can be done by finding Walsh-
Hadamard coefficients of g with complexity of O(p2p). In phase II, we
just have a matrix multiplication of Ak×n and Bn×n∗ to form A∗. This
process has the compexity of O(knn∗) in general. But due to sparse
form of matrix B in (8), this complexity is reduced to O(kpn∗). Finally,
the complexity of phase III relies on the complexity of the LPN solver
algorithm. So, the complexity of our attack is calculated by (13) in which
the complexity of phases I, II and III are denoted by CI ,CI I and CI I I
respectively.
C = CI + CI I + CI I I = O(p2p) +O(kpn∗) + CI I I
≈ O(kpn∗) + CI I I , n∗ >> p (13)
It should be noted that the complexity which computed in(13) is the
time complexity of our attack. To be more precise, we should calculate
the data complexity of our attack in terms of the amount of protocol
rounds required to apply the attack(n∗) as well. Phase I and II are
applied on the number of rounds of the protocol which are determined
in phase III and these two phases do not impose any additional data
complexity to our attack. Therefore, data complexity of our attack only
relies on the data complexity of LPN solvers discussed in [18–20].
77
Security Analysis Of Lightweight Schemes for RFID Systems
4 RE S U LT S
In this section, we demonstrate the results of applying our passive
attack using three LPN solvers BKW,FMICM and CTIN on NLHB and
compare the security margins of NLHB(i.e. its equivalent HB) with
HB protocol with the same parameters. Our motivation to do such an
unfair comparison is to demonstrate that security margin of the NLHB
is not far more than th HB protocol with the same parameters.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 show a comparative time and data complexity of
applying passive attacks on NLHB and HB protocol for three different
but low noise probability (η = 0.15, 0.10, 0.05 for HB and correspondent
η∗ = 0.36, 0.32, 0.29 in NLHB respectively) as well as the number of
rounds of the protocol required to apply the attack (data complexity).
As the results show, not only are the passive attacks on HB applicable
to NLHB, but also the security margin of NLHB protocol is not far more
than HB protocol. It is manifest that the results of our attack using
FMICM are remarkably better in comparison with BKW and CTIN.
Furthermore, we can have better results when the noise vector in the
protocol has a lower weights(Table 5).
5 CO N C L U S I O N S
We presented a passive attack against NLHB protocol by finding an
HB equivalent of it and then using some LPN solver techniques. Our
results not only negate the authors claim that their protocol is resistant
to passive attacks on the HB protocol but also show that the NLHB
has not elevated the security margin of the HB remarkably and this is
mainly due to the poor design of the non-linear part of the NLHB.
In summary, what we did is as follows. We:
• targeted Non-Linear HB protocol for passive attack.
• found a linear approximation of the non linear part of the protocol
and converted the protocol to an equivalent HB protocol with
higher noise.
• applied three well-known LPN solver techniques as a passive
attack to the equivalent protocol.
• calculated the complexity of our attack on NLHB.
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9
Time Complexity Data Complexity
Key Length CTIN BKW FMICM CTIN BKW FMICM
HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB
32 221 226 23 215 28 212 23 211 23 215 28 212
64 29 236 231 240 219 222 213 214 231 240 219 222
128 223 278 247 262 235 245 213 215 247 262 235 245
192 239 2118 263 283 252 267 213 216 263 283 252 267
256 256 2162 276 299 271 288 214 216 276 299 271 288
Table 3. Time complexity and Data complexity passive attacks on HB and NLHB
η = 0.15,η∗ = 0.36
Time Complexity Data Complexity
Key Length CTIN BKW FMICM CTIN BKW FMICM
HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB
32 21 213 220 225 28 210 210 213 220 225 28 210
64 24 230 228 237 217 219 210 213 228 237 217 219
128 213 266 244 259 235 238 213 215 244 259 235 238
192 224 2102 257 278 254 263 213 215 257 278 254 263
256 231 2140 270 294 271 285 214 216 270 294 271 285
Table 4. Time complexity and Data complexity passive attacks on HB and NLHB
η = 0.1,η∗ = 0.32
Time Complexity Data Complexity
Key Length CTIN BKW FMICM CTIN BKW FMICM
HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB HB NLHB
32 21 210 217 223 26 28 211 213 217 223 26 28
64 22 226 224 235 212 216 211 213 224 235 212 216
128 25 257 237 257 225 236 214 215 237 257 225 236
192 29 288 250 273 242 254 214 216 250 273 242 254
256 214 2120 260 289 258 276 214 216 260 289 258 276
Table 5. Time complexity and Data complexity passive attacks on HB and NLHB
η = 0.05,η∗ = 0.29
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Abstract. Recently, Alomair et al. proposed the first Un-
Conditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for low-
cost RFID systems(UCS-RFID). The security of the UCS-
RFID relies on five dynamic secret keys which are updated
at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce)
secretly transmitted from a reader to tags.
Our results show that, at the highest security level of the
protocol (security parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasi-
ble with the probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping(observing)
about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce enables a
passive attacker to recover all five secret keys of the protocol.
To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic approach
in this paper. Our attack recovers the secret keys with a
probability that increases by accessing more protocol runs.
We also show that tracing a tag using this protocol is also
possible even with less runs of the protocol.
Key Words: RFID, Authentication Protocol, Passive At-
tack.
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1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
As of today, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) is referred to as
the next technological revolution after the Internet. A typical RFID
system involves a reader, a number of tags, which may range from the
battery-powered, to the low-cost ones with even no internal power, and
a database. RFID systems enable the identification of objects in various
environments. They can potentially be applied almost everywhere from
electronic passports[19, 20], contactless credit cards[18], to supply chain
management[21–23].
Keeping RFID systems secure is imperative, because they are vul-
nerable to a number of malicious attacks. For low-cost RFID systems,
security problems become much more challenging, as many traditional
security mechanisms are inefficient or even impossible due to resource
constraints. Some existing solutions utilize traditional cryptographic
primitives such as hash or encryption functions, which are often too
expensive to be implemented on low-cost RFID tags.
Another method of securing RFID systems has been the lightweight
approach. These solutions base themselves on mostly lightweight oper-
ations (e.g. bitwise or simple arithmetic operations) instead of more ex-
pensive cryptographic primitives. The HB-family(HB+,HB++, HB*,etc.)
[1–7] and the MAP-family(LMAP,EMAP,M2AP,etc)[8–10] authentica-
tion protocols, are some examples of this kind. However, proposed
lightweight protocols so far have been targeted to various successful
attacks and therefore, the search for a concrete lightweight solution for
authentication in low-cost RFID tags still continues.
Recently, Alomair et al. embarked on the notion of UnCondition-
ally Secure mutual authentication protocol for RFID systems (UCS-
RFID)[16]. UCS-RFID’s security relies mainly on the freshness of five
secret keys rather than the hardness of solving mathematical problems.
Freshness in the keys is guaranteed with a key updating phase at every
protocol run by means of a fresh random number (nonce). This nonce
is generated at the reader side due to low-cost tags constraints, and
delivered to the tag secretly. This allows the tags to benefit from the
functionalities of random numbers without the hardware to generate
them.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a three-phase proba-
bilistic passive attack against the UCS-RFID protocol to recover all the
secret keys in the protocol. Our attack is mainly based on a weakness
observed in the protocol(section 3). To put in a nutshell, the weakness
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implies that the more outputs we have from consecutive runs of the
protocol, the more knowledge we will obtain on the nonces in these
protocol runs. In other words, having more number of protocol run
outputs observed, we are able to determine some of the nonces (victim
nonces) with higher probability. It should be noted that this weakness
has also been tackled by the authors in [16]. Nevertheless we will show
that the security margin they expected from the protocol has been
overestimated. Finding the victim nonce in the protocol paves the way
toward adopting an attacking scenario to achieve all of the five secret
keys in the system.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, we briefly describe the UCS-RFID protocol. In section 3 the
weakness of the protocol is investigated thoroughly. Section 4 and 5
describes our attacking scenario to recover the keys, and trace the tag
in the protocol. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 DE S C R I P T I O N O F T H E UCS-RFID PR O TO C O L
The UCS-RFID authentication protocol consists of two phases: the
mutual authentication phase and the key updating phase. The former phase
mutually authenticates an RFID reader and a tag. In the latter phase
both the reader and the tag update their dynamic secret keys for next
protocol runs.
In this protocol, first the security parameter, N, is specified and a
2N-bit prime integer, p, is chosen. Then, each tag T is loaded with an
N-bit long identifier, A(0), and five secret keys, k(0)a , k
(0)
b , k
(0)
c , k
(0)
d and
k(0)u chosen independently and uniformly from Z2N ,Zp,Zp\{0},Z2N
and Zp\{0} respectively.
2 .1 NO TAT I O N S
- N: security parameter.
- p: a prime number in Z2N
- Ax, Bx,Cx, Dx: observable outputs of xth protocol run
- n = nl ||nr: random number in Z2N
- nl , nr: left and right half-nonces
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Specifications
- Public parameters: p, N.
- Secret parameters(shared between R and T): k(0)a , k
(0)
b , k
(0)
c , k
(0)
d , k
(0)
u .
Mutual Authentication Phase
(1) R⇒ T : Hello
(2) T ⇒ R : A(i)
(3) R⇒ T : B(i),C(i)
(4) T ⇒ R : D(i)
Fig. 1: ith run of the mutual authentication phase in the UCS-RFID protocol
2.2 MU T U A L AU T H E N T I C AT I O N PH A S E
Figure 1 shows one instance run of the mutual authentication phase
in the UCS-RFID protocol. The reader starts the interrogation with a
“Hello” message which is responded by tag’s dynamic identifier A(i).
The reader then looks up in the database for a set of five keys(ka, kb, kc, kd,
and ku) which corresponds to A(i). If this search is successful, it means
that the tag is authentic. Having the tag authenticated, the reader gener-
ates a 2N-bit random nonce n(i) uniformly drawn from Z∗p, calculates
messages B(i) , C(i) by (2),(3) and sends them to the tag.
A(i) ≡ n(i−1)l + k
(i)
a mod 2N (1)
B(i) ≡ n(i) + k(i)b mod p (2)
C(i) ≡ n(i) × k(i)c mod p (3)
The tag first checks the integrity of the received messages by (4):
(B(i) − k(i)b )× k
(i)
c ≡ C(i) mod p (4)
This check implies the authenticity of the reader as well. Then, the tag
extracts the nonce n(i) by (5.)
n(i) ≡ (B(i) − k(i)b ) mod p (5)
To conclude the mutual authentication phase, the tag transmits D(i) as
a receipt of obtaining n(i).
D(i) = n(i)l ⊕ k
(i)
d (6)
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2.3 KE Y UP D AT I N G PH A S E
After a successful mutual authentication, both the reader and the tag
update their keys and dynamic identifier (A(i)) for the next protocol
run.
k(i+1)a = n
(i)
r ⊕ k(i)a (7)
k(i+1)b ≡ k
(i)
u + (n(i) ⊕ k(i)b ) mod p (8)
k(i+1)c ≡ k(i)u × (n(i) ⊕ k(i)c ) mod p (9)
k(i+1)d = n
(i)
r ⊕ k(i)d (10)
k(i+1)u ≡ k(i)u × n(i) mod p (11)
A(i+1) ≡ n(i)l + k
(i+1)
a mod 2N (12)
It should be noted that the dynamic values have been proved to preserve
their properties of independency and uniformity after updating[16].
3 OB S E RVAT I O N
In this section, we shed more light on a weakness in the UCS-RFID
protocol which becomes the origin of our proposed attack presented in
the subsequent section. By xoring (7) and (10), we have:
ki+1a ⊕ ki+1d = kia ⊕ kid (13)
Equation (13) shows that the difference between ka and kd remains the
same for two consecutive runs of the protocol. This statement can also
be generalized for every r arbitrary run of the protocol the as following:
kr+1a ⊕ kr+1d = kra ⊕ krd = . . . = k0a ⊕ k0d = L (14)
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By using (14), for outputs A and D in m consecutive runs of the protocol,
we have:
A(i) ≡ n(i−1)l + k
(i)
a mod 2N (15)
D(i) = n(i)l ⊕ (k
(i)
a ⊕ L) (16)
A(i+1) ≡ n(i)l + (k
(i)
a ⊕ n(i)r ) mod 2N (17)
D(i+1) = n(i+1)l ⊕ (k
(i)
a ⊕ L⊕ n(i)r ) (18)
...
A(i+m−1) ≡ n(i+m−2)l + (k
(i)
a
i+m−2⊕
j=i
n(j)r ) mod 2N (19)
D(i+m−1) = n(i+m−1)l ⊕ (k
(i)
a ⊕ L
i+m−2⊕
j=i
n(j)r ) (20)
It is apparent that we have a set of 2m equations with 2m+ 2 variables.
These variables can be divided into two groups:
1. 2m half-nonces: n(i−1)l , . . . , n
(i+m−1)
l , n
(i)
r , . . . , n
(i+m−2)
r
2. L and k(i)a .
So, if we fix the value of variables L and k(i)a , we end up with 2m
equations and 2m half-nonce variables. This implies that the 2m half-
nonces can not be chosen independently and fulfil the above equations
simultaneously. In other words, if we observe the outputs of m consecu-
tive runs of the protocol, it is only necessary to search over all possible
sequences of k(i)a and L, which is 22N , and then it will be possible to
find all 2m half-nonces uniquely. As we will see, this weakness is the
result of introduction of a tighter bound for the half-nonces while we
keep observing more runs of the protocol.
By the randomness nature of the generated half-nonces, the total
number of possible sequences for them(22N) is uniformly distributed
over them. This implies that each of the 2m half-nonces is expected
to have a bound of 2m
√
22N possible values (comparing to its previous
bound which was N). Therefore, for m consecutive protocol runs, the
total number of possible values distributed over the 2m half-nonces is
2m 2m
√
22N [16].
Now, if we exclude the value which half-nonces has taken already
(2m 2m
√
22N − 2m), we can calculate the probability that at least one half-
nonce does not receive another possible value (remains constant). To do
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Fig. 2: The number of consecutive protocol runs an adversary must observe(m) in order
to infer at least one half-nonce for N = 128, 256
so, we utilize the well-known problem in probability theory(i.e. Given r
balls thrown uniformly at random at b bins, the probability that at least
one bin remains empty which is calculated by (21))[17]:
Pr(at least one bin remains empty) = 1− (
r−1
b−1)
(b+r−1b−1 )
(21)
Now, it only requires to substitute b = 2m and r = 2m. 2m
√
22N − 2m in
(21) and then we will have (22). The result is plotted in Figure 2.
Ph = Pr(at least one half-nonce remains constant) = 1−
(2m.
2m√22N−2m−1
2m−1 )
(2m.
2m√22N−1
2m−1 )
(22)
Figure 2 shows the probability of inferring at least one half-nonce in
terms of the number of consecutive runs of the protocol required to be
observed to do so. For example, if we observe 35 runs of the protocol
runs with N=256, we will be able to determine at least one of the 70
transmitted half-nonces with the probability of more than 0.99.
We will use the term "victim half-nonce” for inferred half-nonce and
notation mh instead of m for the number of consecutive runs of the
protocol required to infer one half-nonce hereafter.
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4 OU R AT TA C K SC E N A R I O
In the previous section, we presented a probabilistic approach to find
the number of consecutive runs of the protocol to infer one half-nonce.
But in our attack, we need to have a complete nonce(left and right
corresponding half-nonces) to recover all secret keys. To achieve this
goal, we propose an attacking scenario which consists of the three
following phases:
1. Finding the total number of necessary consecutive runs of the
protocol to find a complete victim nonce (mt).
2. Finding the victim nonce.
3. Recovering the secret keys.
4 .1 PH A S E I : F I N D I N G mt
In section 3, we proposed a probabilistic way to calculate the number
of consecutive runs that must be observed by an adversary to infer a
half-nonce(mh). It is obvious that if we keep observing more runs of
the protocol(i.e. more than mh), after each extra observation, another
half-nonce can be inferred. This is simply possible by eliminating the
two equations which contain the first victim half-nonce and adding two
newly observed equations to the set of equations (15-20) and then, we
again have 2mh equations and 2mh + 2 variables which yield another
half-nonce inference.
If we intend to find a complete nonce, we must continue observing
the runs of the protocol until we infer two corresponding victim half-
nonces to form a complete nonce. To do so, we should first calculate
the probability that the inferred half-nonce at (me +mh)th run matches
one of the previously victim half-nonces.
As we know, after mh runs of the protocol, we accomplish to find
one victim half-nonce, after me extra runs of the protocol, we have
β = 2mh + 2me equations and β half-nonces which me + 1 of them can
be inferred. The probability that none of these me + 1 half-nonces match
is:
Pr(Having no pair after mh +me runs) =
(β− 1)
β
× . . .× (β−me)
β
=
∏mei=1(β− i)
β(me)
(23)
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Consequently, the probability of having at least one pair after observing
me runs is simply calculated by (24).
Pe = Pr(Having at least one pair of matching half-nonces after mh +me runs)
= 1− ∏
me
i=1(β− i)
β(me)
(24)
By using (22) and (24) the total number of protocol runs to have at least
one complete victim nonce (mt = mh +me) can be calculated by (25)
and is plotted in Figure 3.
Pt = Pr(Having at least one complete nonce after mt runs)
= (Pe|mh = h)× Pr(mh = h) = (Pe|mh = h)× Ph(h) (25)
Remark The authors of [16] have also calculated mt by using some
other protocol outputs (B and C). Figure 3 compares our results with
what the authors "Expected”. This comparison has been conducted for
two different security parameters N=128,N=256 which are plotted on
the left and right respectively.
The results show that the security margin of the protocol in terms
of the number of consecutive runs that must be observed to infer one
nonce is less than what the designers of the protocol expected. In other
words, we need less number of protocol runs to infer at least one nonce.
For example a passive adversary is able to infer a complete nonce with
high probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping less that 60 and 90 runs of
the protocol for the key size of 128 and 256 bits respectively. These
numbers were expected to be 110 and 200 respectively.
4 .2 PH A S E I I : F I N D I N G T H E C O N S TA N T N O N C E
Having mh consecutive runs of the protocol observed, we have one
constant half-nonce or one half-nonce with only one possible value. In
order to find this half-nonce, we adopt the following algorithm.
Algorithm Inputs :A(i), . . . , A(i+mt−1), D(i), . . . , D(i+mt−1)
1. Determine a level of confidence(probability) for the final results.
2. Find the mh, mt related to the determined probability from Figures
1,2 respectively.
3. Calculate me = mt −mh
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Our Result Expected
Fig. 3: Comparison of expected security margin of the UCS-RFID protocol and our
results in terms of the number of consecutive protocol runs an adversary must
observe in order to infer at least one nonce.
4. Choose two random numbers from Z2N and assign them to L,k
(i)
a
respectively.
5. Find 2m nonces (n(i−1)l , . . . , n
(i+mh−1)
l , n
(i)
r , . . . , n
(i+mh−2)
r ) as fol-
lows.
Find n(i−1)l from (15) i.e. n
(i−1)
l ≡ A(i) − k
(i)
a mod 2N .
Find n(i) from (16) i.e. n(i)l = D
(i) ⊕ (k(i)a ⊕ L).
Find n(i)r from (17) i.e. n
(i)
r ≡ (A(i+1) − n(i)l mod 2N)⊕ k
(i)
a .
...
Find n(i+mh−2)r from (19) i.e. n
(i+mh−2)
r ≡ (A(i+mh−1)−n(i+mh−2)l mod 2N)⊕
(k(i)a
⊕i+mh−2
j=i n
(j)
r ).
Find n(i+mh−1)l from (20) i.e. n
(i+mh−1)
l = D
(i+mh−1) ⊕ (k(i)a ⊕
L)
⊕i+mh−2
j=i n
(j)
r .
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6. Repeat 4 and 5 as many times as we observe that only one half-
nonce keeps its value for all of the repetitions.
7. Save the constant(victim) half-nonce.
8. Observe another run of the protocol.
A(i+mh) ≡ n(i+mh−1)l + (k
(i)
a
⊕i+mh−1
j=i n
(j)
r ) mod 2N
D(i+mh) = n(i+mh)l ⊕ (k
(i)
a ⊕ L⊕i+mh−1j=i n(j)r ).
9. Replace the equations corresponding to the found victim half-
nonce with two newly observed equations in the equation set
(15-20).
10. Repeat 4,5,6,7,8 for me times.
11. Match two corresponding victim half-nonces(e.g. n(j)l , n
(j)
r ).
12. Output the victim nonce (n(j) = n(j)l ||n
(j)
r ).
4 .3 PH A S E I I I : KE Y RE C O V E RY
In the previous two phases of our attack, we accomplished to find a
complete victim nonce n(j) ,with a certain probability, by observing mt
consecutive runs of the protocol. Now, we present how an adversary is
able to recover all five secret keys of the protocol. To find k(j)a , k
(j)
b , k
(j)
c
and k(j)d , we should follow(26-29).
k(j)a ≡ (A(j+1) − n(j)l )⊕ n
(j)
r mod 2N (26)
k(j)b ≡ B(j) − n(j) mod p (27)
k(j)c ≡ ( 1n(j) mod p)× C
(j) mod p (28)
k(j)d = n
(j)
l ⊕ D(j) (29)
To recover k(j)u , we need to find the nonce in the next run (n(j+1)), thus
we should calculate the updated keys for the (j+ 1)th run using (7) and
(10).
k(j+1)a = k
(j)
a ⊕ n(j)r (30)
k(j+1)d = k
(j)
d ⊕ n
(j)
r (31)
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Then we have:
n(j+1)l = D
(j+1) ⊕ k(j+1)d (32)
k(j+2)a = A(j+2) ⊕ n(j+1)l (33)
Using (30) and (33), we can write:
n(j+1)r = k
(j+2)
a ⊕ k(j+1)a (34)
Finally, by using (27),(32) and,(34) we can find k(j)u .
k(j)u ≡ B(j+1) − n(j+1) − (k(j)b ⊕ n(j+1)) mod p (35)
The procedure above provides us with our objective to recover all of
the secret keys with a certain probability(Pt). This probability can be
increased by paying the price of having more protocol run outputs
available.
Furthermore, as it can be seen from the (32) and (34), next nonce is
also achievable. This implies that the secret keys of the next run can
also be calculated by using (26-35) for the next run. This is an ongoing
procedure which yields the keys of any arbitrary run of the protocol(r)
which r > j. Being able to generate the future secret keys, an adversary
is capable of either impersonating both the reader and the tag or tracing
the tag.
5 ON T H E TR A C E A B I L I T Y O F T H E UCS-RFID
In the previous section, we presented a probabilistic key recovery attack
against the UCS-RFID protocol. We mentioned that according to Figure
3, we need to have about 90 runs of the protocol to be almost sure
that our found keys are correct. But with less number of protocol run
outputs, we still can apply an attack against the traceability of the
protocol. In this section, we formally investigate the untraceability of the
UCS-RFID based on the formal description in [11].
5 .1 AD V E R S A R I A L MO D E L
According to [11], the means that are accessible to an attacker are the
following: We denote a tag and a reader in ith run of the protocol by Ti
and Ri, respectively.
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• Query(Ti,m1,m3): This query models the attacker A sending a
message m1 to the tag and sending the m3 after receiving the
response.
• Send(Ri,m2): This query models the attacker A sending a mes-
sage m2 to the Reader and being acknowledged.
• Execute(Ti,Ri): This query models the attacker A executing a run
of protocol between the Tag and Reader to obtain the exchanged
messages.
• Reveal(Ti): This query models the attacker A obtaining the infor-
mation on the Tag’s memory.
A Passive Adversary, AP , is capable of eavesdropping all communica-
tions between a tag and a reader and accesses only to the Execute(Ti,Ri):
.
5 .2 AT TA C K I N G UN T R A C E A B I L I T Y
The result of application of an oracle for a passive attackOP ⊆ {Execute(.)}
on a tag T in the run i is denoted by wi(T). Thus, a set of I protocol
run outputs, ΩI(T), is:
ΩI(T) = {wi(T)|i ∈ I} ; I ⊆ N;(N denotes the total set of protocol
runs).
The formal description of attacking scenario against untraceability of a
protocol is as following:
1. AP requests the Challenger to give her a target T.
2. AP chooses I and calls Oracle(T, I,OP ) where |I| ≤ lre f receives
ΩI(T).
3. AP requests the Challenger thus receiving her challenge T1, T2 ,I1and
I2
4. AP calls Oracle(T1, I1,OP ) , Oracle(T2, I2,OP ) then receives ΩI1(T1)
, ΩI2(T2).
5. AP decides which of T1 or T2 is T, then outputs her guess T´.
For a security parameter,k, if AdvUNTAP (k) = 2Pr(T´ = T)− 1 > e then
we can say that the protocol is traceable.
For UCS-RFID case, as Figure 3 implies, an adversary AP needs only
to access to about 40 and 65 consecutive runs of the protocol to be
able to determine n(j) with a probability of more than 0.5 (e.g. 0.6) for
k =128 and 256 respectively and then according to section 4.3, she will
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be able to recover the keys of subsequent runs. After, key recovery, the
adversary can easily distinguish a target tag with any other challenge
tag given by the challenger. So we have:
∀lre f ≥ 40, AdvUNTAP (128) = 2Pr(T´ = T)− 1 = 0.1 > e.
∀lre f ≥ 65,AdvUNTAP (256) = 2Pr(T´ = T)− 1 = 0.1 > e.
6 CO N C L U S I O N S
The design of suitable lightweight security protocols for low-cost RFID
tags is still a big challenge due to their severe constraints. Despite of
interesting proposals in the literature, this field still lacks a concrete
solution.
Recently, Alomair et al have proposed the first authentication protocol
based on the notion of unconditional security. Regardless of some
inefficiencies in UCS-RFID authentication protocol, such as: large key
sizes, using modular multiplication ,etc ,which makes this protocol an
unsuitable nominate for low-cost RFID tag deployment, we presented a
passive attack which showed that even the security margin which was
expected to be yielded by UCS-RFID has also been overestimated.
In our attack, we showed that a passive adversary is able to achieve
the all secret keys of the system with a high probability of 0.99 by
eavesdropping less that 60 and 90 runs of the protocol for the key size
of 128 and 256 bits respectively. Tracing the tag in the protocol is also
feasible even by less number of runs of the protocol (e.g. 40, 65).
Our results suggest a major rethink in the design of the authentication
protocols for RFID systems based on unconditional security notion.
Drastic changes are necessary to fulfil both technological constraints
and security concerns in RFID systems.
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SE C U R I T Y AN A LY S I S O F T W O
D I S TA N C E -BO U N D I N G PR O TO C O L S
Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh∗
Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the security of two
recently proposed distance bounding protocols called the
“Hitomi” and the “NUS” protocols. Our results show that the
claimed security of both protocols has been overestimated.
Namely, we show that the Hitomi protocol is susceptible to
a full secret key disclosure attack which not only results in
violating the privacy of the protocol but also can be exploited
for further attacks such as impersonation, mafia fraud and
terrorist fraud attacks. Our results also demonstrates that the
probability of success in a distance fraud attack against the
NUS protocol can be increased up to ( 34 )
n and even slightly
more, if the adversary is furnished with some computational
capabilities.
Keywords: RFID, Privacy, Distance bounding protocol,
Distance fraud
1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is widely being de-
ployed today in many applications which require security, such as
payment and access control applications. Although many solutions
have been proposed to secure RFID systems, most of them are still
susceptible to different attacks related to location such as: distance fraud,
mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. All of these attacks aim at sug-
gesting a wrong assumption of the distance between a tag and a reader.
∗Department of Informatics, University of Bergen
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In distance fraud attack, a tag operates from out of the range where it
is supposed to be. Mafia fraud attack, is a kind of man-in-the-middle
attack in which a rogue tag circumvents the security mechanisms by
getting right answers from the legitimate tag via a rogue reader, while
both legitimate entities (legitimate reader and tag) remain unaware. In
the terrorist attack, a legitimate tag colludes with the adversary, giving
her the necessary information to access the system by impersonating it
for a limited number of times.
The described attacks require simpler technical resources than tam-
pering or cryptanalysis, and they cannot be prevented by ordinary
security protocols that operate in the high layers of the protocol stack.
The main countermeasure against these attacks is the use of distance
bounding protocols, which verify not only that the tag knows the cryp-
tographic secret, but also that is within a certain distance. To achieve
this goal, distance bounding protocols must be tightly integrated into
the physical layer [1].
In 1993, Brands and Chaum proposed the first distance bounding
protocol [5]. Afterward, in 2005, Hancke and Kuhn [6] proposed the first
distance-bounding protocol dedicated to RFID systems. This protocol
has the drawback of giving the adversary this chance to succeed with
the probability of ( 34 )
n rather than ( 12 )
n in distance and mafia fraud
attacks, where n is a security parameter. Since then, there have been
many solutions proposed either similar to Hancke and Kuhn [2, 7, 8, 10–
12] or with different structures [5, 8, 9, 13–15]. However, they mostly
have something in common; they all consist of three phases, the first
and the last ones called slow phases, and the second one called the fast
phase. The round trip time (RTT) of a bitwise challenge and response is
measured n times during the fast phase to estimate the distance, while
the slow phases include all the time-consuming operations.
Recently, two distance bounding protocols have been proposed by
Lopez et al and Gürel et al called Hitomi [4] and Non-Uniform Stepping
(NUS) [15] distance bounding protocols respectively. These protocols
are claimed to provide privacy and resistance against distance, mafia
and terrorist fraud attacks.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we apply a key disclosure attack to
the Hitomi protocol and a distance fraud attack on the NUS protocol.
Our analysis is framed in the formal framework introduced in [16].
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 includes a succinct description of the framework we do our security
analysis within. In Sections 3, we describe the Hitomi protocol, its
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security claims and our key disclosure attack on it. In Section 4, we
explain the NUS protocol and explain our distance fraud attack against
it, and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 PR E L I M I N A R I E S
See Section 5.2.3 of the thesis.
2 .1 NO TAT I O N S
Here, we explain the notations used hereafter.
• x: Secret key of the tag.
• fx(.): Pseudo-Random Function operation with secret key x.
• hw(.): Hamming Weight calculation function.
• NR, NT : Random numbers generated by the reader and the tag
respectively.
• n: The length of registers considered as a security parameter.
2 .2 AS S U M P T I O N S
The protocols described in this paper are executed under following
assumptions:
• The tag and the reader share a long-term secret key x.
• Each tag has a unique identifier ID.
• The tag’s capabilities supports a Pseudo-Random Function ( f )
and can perform bitwise operations.
• The reader and the tag agree on:
– a security parameter n.
– a public pseudo random function f with length of n bits.
– a timing bound tmax
– a fault tolerance threshold τ.
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3 TH E H I TO M I PR O TO C O L
3.1 DE S C R I P T I O N
As stated in Section 1, being a distance bounding protocol, the Hitomi
protocol (Figure 1) consists of three phases, two slow phases which are
carried out at the first and final part of the protocol called preparation
phase and final phase respectively. And the fast phase which is executed
in between, called rapid bit exchange phase.
In the preparation phase, the reader chooses a random nonce (NR)
and transmits it to the tag. In return, the tag chooses three random
numbers NT1 , NT2 and NT3 and computes two temporary keys (k1 and
k2) as (1) and (2).
k1 = fx(NR, NT1 , W) (1)
k2 = fx(NT2 , NT3 , W
′) (2)
where W and W ′ represent two constant parameters. By using these
keys, the tag splits its permanent secret key x into two shares as response
registers(i.e. R0 = k1 and R1 = k2 ⊕ x). Finally, the tag transmits the
3-tuple {NT1 , NT2 , NT3} to the reader.
The rapid bit exchange phase is a challenge and response phase with
n rounds. In its ith round, the reader generates a random challenge
bit ci and sends it to the tag while initializing a clock to zero. The tag
receives c′i which may not be equal to ci due to errors or alterations
in the channel. Immediately upon receiving c′i, the tag responses with
r′i = R
ci
i . The reader stops the clock after receiving ri, which may not
be equal to r′i due to errors or alterations in the channel, and computes
the round trip time (RTT) of this challenge and response transaction
and stores it as ∆ti.
The final phase starts with computing and sending two following
messages from the tag to the reader.
m = {c′1, ..., c′n, r′1, ..., r′n} (3)
tB = fx(m, ID, NR, NT1 , NT2 , NT3) (4)
Finally, the reader computes three kinds of errors and checks whether
their summation is below a fault tolerance threshold as following.
• errc: the number of times that ci 6= c′i.
• errr: the number of times that ci = c′i but ri 6= Rcii .
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• errt: the number of times that ci = c′i but the response delay ∆ti
is more than a timing bound threshold tmax(∆ti > tmax).
If the reader authentication is also demanded, the reader computes
tA = fx(NR, k2) and transmits it to the tag. Once the tag checks its
correctness, the two entities are mutually authenticated.
The authors claim that the Hitomi protocol provides mutual authen-
tication between the tag and the reader and also guarantees privacy
protection. The authors argue that the success probability of the mafia
and distance fraud attacks against their scheme is bounded by ( 12 )
n.
3 .2 KE Y D I S C L O S U R E AT TA C K
In this section, we present an attacking scenario to the Hitomi protocol
which leads to tag’s secret key disclosure. Our main assumption in this
attack is that the reader authentication is not demanded and so the
protocol is executed without the optional message tA. This allows an
unauthorized reader(adversary) to query the tag several times without
being detected.
Algorithm 1 portrays how an adversary is able to extract ∆ bits of
the tag’s secret key by querying the tag m times.
The algorithm starts with the preparation phase in which at mth run,
the adversary first generates a new random number NR, sends it to the
tag and receives the 3-tuple of {NT1 , NT2 , NT3} in return.
The rapid bit exchange phase of the algorithm starts with generation
of a challenge vector by the adversary which contains ∆ bits of 1 and
n− ∆ bits of 0 (c(m)). By sending the bits of this challenge vector to
the tag in n rounds of the rapid bit exchange phase and receiving the
responses, the adversary obtains n− ∆ bits of R0 = k1 and ∆ bits of
R1 = k2 ⊕ x.
We know that if the adversary is able to find k1, she will be able
to calculate k2 by (2). Now, the adversary requires to search over all
possible 2∆ values for k1. If we observe the output of fk1(N
(m)
T2
, N(m)T3 , W
′)
in the mth run of the protocol for 2∆ times, each time with one different
possible value of k1, we will see that the number of values for the first
∆ bits of k2 (k2(1), ..., k2(∆)) is less than 2∆. This can be calculated by a
well-known problem in probability theory described in Remark 1.
Each k2 nominates one X∆ = (x(1), ..., x(∆)) for ∆ bits of the tag’s
secret key (Line 16 of the Algorithm 1). So, each time the adversary
queries the tag, she will obtain a set of potential candidates for X∆.
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Reader Tag
x, ID x, ID
NR ∈R {0, 1}n
NR−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT1 , NT2 , NT3 ∈R {0, 1}n
NT1 ,NT2 ,NT3←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
k1 = fx(NR, NT1 ,W )
k2 = fk1(NT2 , NT3 ,W
′){
R0 = k1
R1 = k2 ⊕ x
Start of rapid bit exchange
for i = 1...n
ci ∈ {0, 1}
start clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
r′i = R
c′i
i
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
stop clock
Compute ∆ti
End of rapid bit exchange
m = {c′1, ..., c′n, r′1, ..., r′n}
tB = fx(m, ID,NR, NT1 , NT2 , NT3)
m,tB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check ID in the Database
Compute R0, R1
errc = #{i : ci 6= c′i}
errr = #{i : ci = c′i, ri 6= Rcii }
errt = #{i : ci = c′i,∆ti > tmax}
if errc + errr + errt ≥ τ
REJECT
else
tA = fx(NR, k2)
tA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Compute and Compare tA
Fig. 2. Hitomi RFID Distance Bounding
3.2 Key Disclosure Attack
In this section, we present an attacking scenario to the Hitomi protocol which
leads to tag’s secret key disclosure. Our main assumption in this attack is that
the reader authentication is not demanded and so the protocol is executed with-
out the optional message tA. This allows an unauthorized reader(adversary) to
query the tag several times without being detected.
Fig. 1: Hitomi Distance Bounding Protocols.
If she continues querying the tag, each time she will obtain a set of
different candidates.
These candidates can be re oved from the list by further querying,
unless they re nominated in the other runs. And the final candidate
is the one which has been in the candidate list in all the queries. The
number of times that the adversary must query the tag to be left with
only one candidate is calculated by (7) and plotted in Figures 2 and 3.
Remark 1. Consider the process of tossing b balls into b bins. The
tosses are uniformly at random and independent of each other. The
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Algorithm 1 ∆ bit secret key disclosure
Inputs: n,∆, W, W ′
Outputs: m,∆ bits of secret key x (x1, ..., x∆)
1: m← 1 {number of required runs of the protocol}
2: repeat
3: Numbero f Candidates← 0
4: FinalCandidate← 0
5: {counter(1), ..., counter(2∆)} ← {0x0, ..., 0x0}
6: {CandidateFlag(1), ..., CandidateFlag(2∆)} ← {0x0, ..., 0x0}
7: Generate N(m)R and Send to the tag.
8: Receive N(m)T1 , N
(m)
T2
, N(m)T3
9: c(m) ← (1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−∆
)
10: send the challenges to the tag in n rounds and receive the re-
sponses.
11: r(m) ← (r(m)
(1) , ..., r
(m)
(n) )
12: (k1(∆+1), ..., k1(n))← (r(m)(∆+1), ..., r
(m)
(n) )
13: for i = 0 to 2∆ − 1 do
14: (k1(1), ..., k1(∆))← Decimal2Binary(i)∗
15: (k2(1), ..., k2(n))← fk1(N
(m)
T2
, N(m)T3 , W
′)
16: (x(1), ..., x(∆))← (k2(1), ..., k2(∆))⊕ (r(m)(1) , ..., r
(m)
(∆) )
17: l ← Binary2Decimal(x(1), ..., x(∆))∗∗
18: if CandidateFlag(l) = 0 then
19: counter(l)← counter(l) + 1
20: CandidateFlag(l)← 1
21: end if
22: end for
23: for j = 1 to 2∆ do
24: if counter(j) = m then
25: Numbero f Candidates← Numbero f Candidates + 1
26: FinalCandidate← j
27: end if
28: end for
29: m← m + 1
30: until Numbero f Candidates = 1
31: (x(1), ..., x(∆))← Decimal2Binary(FinalCandidate)
32: return m, (x(1), ..., x(∆))
* Decimal2Binary(.) outputs the binary representation of a given decimal
number.
** Binary2Decimal(.) outputs the decimal representation of a given
binary number.
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probability of not falling any ball into a particular bin can be calculated
by (5) [17].
Pr(one particular bin remains empty) = p0 =
(
1− 1
b
)b
≈ 1
e
, b 1
(5)
Hence, the probability that a ball does not remain empty is simply
p1 = 1− p0. Due to independency, if we repeat the same experiment for
m trials, the probability that one particular bin remains empty at least
in one of m trials is 1− pm1 . Now, we can calculate the probability that
all bins experience to be empty at least in one of m trials (Pr(Success))
by (6).
Pr(Success) = (1− pm1 )b =
(
1−
(
1−
(
1− 1
b
)b)m)b
(6)
≈
[
1−
(
1− 1
e
)m]b
, b 1
For our problem it is only required to substitute b with 2∆ and we will
have:
PSucc = Pr(Success) =
1−(1−(1− 1
2∆
)2∆)m2∆ (7)
Figure 2 illustrates the probability of success calculated in (7) while the
number of protocol runs are increased. The figures have been plotted for
∆ = 4,8,16 and 32, which should be chosen according to computational
constraints. So far, we have accomplished to find the first ∆ bits of the
tag’s secret key with a certain probability. In a similar vein, one can
find other bits of the secret key by choosing a different challenge vector
(e.g. for finding (x(∆+1), ..., x(2∆)) the challenge should be chosen like
(8) and the above algorithm should be executed another time).
c = (0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2∆
) (8)
In this way, the adversary accomplishes to find the whole tag’s secret
key, if she can query the tag for enough times. Figure 3 illustrates the
number of runs of the protocol which an adversary must query the
tag and its probability of success to find the entirety of tags’s secret
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Fig. 2: Adversary success probability to
find ∆ bits of the secret key.
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Fig. 3: Adversary success probability to
find the whole secret key for ∆ = 16.
key, assuming that her computational capability is limited to 2∆ = 216
computations. The computations include: searching over 2∆ values of
k1, finding k2 for each k1 and candidate one X∆.
The graphs have been plotted for four different key sizes n = 32, 64, 80
and 128. For instance, the adversary is required to query the tag about
70, 140, 175 and 280 times to find the tag’s secret keys of size 32, 64, 80
and 128 bits with the probability of about 0.9 respectively.
It is obvious that having this attack accomplished, the adversary is
able to easily either track or impersonate the tag in further interroga-
tions. The information elicited in this attack also paves the way for
performing other attacks such as mafia or terrorist fraud attacks.
4 TH E NUS PR O TO C O L
4.1 DE S C R I P T I O N
The NUS protocol (Figure 4) also consists of three phases, two slow
phases a fast called rapid bit exchange phase.
In the first slow phase, the reader chooses a random nonce(NR) and
transmits it to the tag. In return, the tag chooses another random
number(NT) and computes the response register R = fx(NR, NT),
which is of length 2n. The tag then initializes the variables j1, j2, k1
and k2 to 1, n, 0 and 2n + 1 respectively and sends back NT to the
reader.
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In the ith round of the rapid bit exchange phase, the reader generates
a random challenge bit ci and sends it to the tag while initializing a
clock to zero. The tag receives c′i which may not be equal to ci due to
errors or alterations in the channel. Immediately upon receiving c′i, the
tag sends the bit r′i , computed according to the procedure shown in
Figure 4.
The final phase concludes with sending the message m which consists
of all challenges the tag has received, from the tag to the reader and
finally, the error computation which is almost the same as in the Hitomi
protocol.
The authors claim that the success probability of the distance, mafia
and terrorist fraud attacks against the NUS protocol is bounded by ( 12 )
n.
4 .2 D I S TA N C E F R A U D AT TA C K
In this section, we present a distance fraud attack on the NUS protocol
in two different forms in white-box model: restricted adversary and pow-
erful adversary. The main assumption we have is that the adversary is
located at zone Z1, i.e. at the ith round of the rapid bit exchange phase,
the adversary accesses to the value of the challenge bit in previous
round ci−1, before generating current response ri. This assumption im-
plies that the adversary is able to update the registers j1, j2, k1 and k2
and she is aware of their correct current values, before she generates
the response.
Restricted adversary
The adversary is allowed to run only once the pseudo-random function
f function to compute R and observe its content before any response.
The probability of success for the distance fraud attack in this model
can be calculated by (9).
Pdis = Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00)Pr(xj1xj2 = 00)
+ Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 01)Pr(xj1xj2 = 01)
+ Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 10)Pr(xj1xj2 = 10)
+ Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 11)Pr(xj1xj2 = 11) (9)
If xj1xj2 = 00 and without knowing ci, the adversary should antici-
pate the right response(ri) between Rk1+1 and Rk2−1. Let us define the
probability of equality of these two bits by (10).
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Reader Tag
x, ID x, ID
NR ∈R {0, 1}n
NR−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ∈R {0, 1}n
R = fx(NR, NT ), |R| = 2n
j1 = 1, j2 = n
k1 = 0, k2 = 2n+ 1
NT←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Start of rapid bit exchange
for i = 1...n
ci ∈ {0, 1}
start clock
ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if c′i = 0
if xj1 = 0
k1 = k1 + 1, r′i = Rk1
else
k2 = k2− 2, r′i = Rk2
j1 = j1 + 1
else
if xj2 = 0
k2 = k2− 1, r′i = Rk2
else
k1 = k1 + 2, r′i = Rk1
j2 = j2− 1
ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
stop clock, Compute ∆ti
End of rapid bit exchange
m = {c′1, ..., c′n}
m
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
errc = #{i : ci 6= c′i}
Compute (r′i)
′s using (c′i)
′s
errr = #{i : ci = c′i, ri 6= r′′i }
errt = #{i : ci = c′i,∆ti > tmax}
Checks errc + errr + errt ≤ τ
Fig. 5. The NUS Distance Bounding Protocol
If Rk1+1 = Rk2−1, the adversary can simply outputs either of these two bits and
succeeds with the probability 1. Otherwise, she outputs a random bit and she
will have the success probability of 12 . So,
Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00) = 1× Peq + 1
2
× (1− Peq) = (1 + Peq)
2
(13)
Fig. 4: The NUS Distance Bounding Protocol
Peq = Pr(Rk1+1 = Rk2−1) (10)
So, we have,
Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00) = Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00, Rk1+1 = Rk2−1)(Peq)
+ Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00, Rk1+1 6= Rk2−1)(1− Peq)
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If Rk1+1 = Rk2−1, the adversary can simply outputs either of these
two bits and succeeds with the probability 1. Otherwise, she outputs a
random bit and she will have the success probability of 12 . So,
Pr(Success|xj1xj2 = 00) = 1× Peq + 12 × (1− Peq) =
(1 + Peq)
2
(11)
We can do similar calculations for other three possibilities of xj1xj2. Since
all four possibilities of xj1xj2 are equally likely, we have the probability
of success for a distance fraud attack in one round as (12).
Pdis =
(1 + Peq)
2
(12)
In a similar vein, one can show that due to independency of the n
rounds, the adversary obtains the success probability of ( 1+Peq2 )
n for n
rounds. If we assume that zeros and ones are equally likely, Peq equals
to 12 and for n rounds we have:
Pdis = (
3
4
)n (13)
Powerful adversary
Our main assumptions in this attack are as following. We assume
that, there is a 1-second latency between the preparation and rapid bit
exchange phases of the protocol. It implies that the adversary can run
the pseudo-random function f for c times between the preparation and
the rapid bit exchange phases, where c the number of a simple random
number function like a hash function that can be computed per second
on a single PC [16].
In [16], Avoine et al has presented an instance of a distance fraud
attack against a white-box-modeled tag in Hancke and Kuhn protocol.
They have devoted the white-box modeled tag’s capabilities to mini-
mize the hamming weight difference of n-bit response registers in the
Hancke and Kuhn protocol(hw(R0 ⊕ R1)). They have proved that if
Pi = Pr(success|(hw(R0 ⊕ R1) = i)), the probability of success in the
distance fraud attack can be calculated by (14).
Pdis =
(
1
2
)cn
×
i=n−1∑
i=0
(Pi)
(j=n∑
j=i
(
n
j
))c
−
(
j=n
∑
j=i+1
(
n
j
))c+ 1

(14)
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n=32 n=64 n=80 n=128
Claimed 2.3283E-10 5.4210E-20 8.2718E-25 2.9387E-39
Security
Restricted 1.0045E-4 1.0090E-8 1.0113E-10 1.0183E-16
Adversary
Powerful 0.0035 4.5101E-7 4.7459E-9 5.1498E-15
Adversary
Table 1: Comparison of the probability of success for distance fraud attack against the
NUS protocol for c = 223 ≈ E6.
In order to utilize (14) for our purpose, we define Pi = Pr(Success|hw(R) =
i). This implies that, we devote the tag’s capability to minimize the
hamming weight of the response register R in the NUS protocol. Hav-
ing this in mind and by using (12), we can calculate Pi for n rounds as
following.
Peq = (
i
2n
)2 + (
2n− i
2n
)2 = 1 +
i2 − 2in
2n2
Pi = Pdis =
[
(1 + Peq)
2
]n
=
(
1 +
i2 − 2in
4n2
)n
(15)
As the response register R in the NUS protocol is of length 2n, we only
need to substitute n by 2n and Pi by (15) in (14). Table 1 compares
the claimed security of the NUS protocol and our results in restricted
and powerful adversary models in terms of the probability of success
of an adversary in the distance fraud attack. For example, for n = 32,
the probability of success in the distance fraud attack in a restricted
adversary model is 1.0045E-4. This probability improves to 0.0035 in
a powerful adversary model for c = 223 which roughly represents the
number of hashes that can be computed today per second on a single
PC [16]. These probabilities are remarkably beyond the claimed security
( 12 )
32 = 2.3283E-10.
5 CO N C L U S I O N S
The design of a secure distance bounding protocol which can resist
against the existing attacks for RFID systems is still challenging. Despite
115
Security Analysis Of Lightweight Schemes for RFID Systems
of interesting proposals in the literature, this field still lacks a concrete
solution.
Recently, two solutions have been proposed for this purpose called
the Hitomi and the NUS distance bounding protocols. We presented a
secret key disclosure attack on the former and a distance fraud attack
on the latter protocol. Our results showed that the security margins
which was expected to be yielded by them have been overestimated.
We showed that the Hitomi protocol is vulnerable to a full secret key
disclosure attack by querying the tag several times. In addition, the
probability of success in a distance fraud attack against the NUS proto-
col was shown to be able to be increased up to ( 34 )
n, if the adversary
gets close enough to the reader. This probability can even be slightly
improved, if the tag has some computational capabilities.
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C O L L U D I N G TA G S AT TA C K O N T H E
E C C - B A S E D G R O U P I N G P R O O F S F O R
R F I D S
Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh∗
Abstract. Recently, a new privacy-preserving elliptic curve
based grouping proof protocol with colluding tag preven-
tion(CTP) has been proposed. The CTP protocol is claimed
to be resistant against colluding tags attacks in which the in-
volved tags can exchange some messages via another reader
before the protocol starts without revealing their private
keys.
In this paper, we show that the CTP protocol is vulnera-
ble to some colluding tag attacking scenario. In addition,
we propose a new elliptic curve based grouping protocol
which can fix the problem. Our proposal is based on a for-
mally proved privacy preserving authentication protocol
and has the advantage of being resistant against colluding
tags attacks with the same amount of computation.
Keywords: RFID, Grouping Proofs, Elliptic Curve, Privacy.
1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
In 2004, Juels [1] proposed a new security notion called Yoking Proofs.
The proposed scheme enables the generation of a proof which shows
that a pair of RFID tags are scanned simultaneously by a reader. Yoking
proofs were later generalized to grouping proofs which indicates that
multiple tags participate in the generation of a proof [2, 8].
∗Department of Informatics, University of Bergen
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By adopting grouping proofs, the manufacturer can prove to its cus-
tomers that the referred products are sold at the same time. For example
in a pharmacy store, some drugs must be sold according to the recipe.
For inpatients, the medical staffs can guarantee the authentication and
integrity of a group of medical items like inpatient bracelets and the
containers of drugs [6]. For car industry, a grouping proof ensures that
all components of a car are assembled in the same factory [1, 9].
Recently, Batina et al have proposed a new privacy-preserving ellip-
tic curve based grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag prevention
(denoted by CTP protocol)[13]. The protocol is claimed to be resistant
against all active attacks applied on the previous grouping proof proto-
cols and also fulfil the privacy against a narrow-strong adversary. The
notion of the CTP protocol is mainly derived from the latest version of
their elliptic curve based authentication protocols called EC-RAC III
[20].
Remark1. With elliptic curve cryptography emerging as a serious al-
ternative, the desired level of security can be attained with significantly
smaller key sizes. This makes ECC very attractive for devices with
limited computational capabilities. On the feasibility of implementing
ECC on RFID tags, one may argue that it is too heavy to be deployed
on low-cost tags such as EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 standard tags.
Nevertheless, there have been many proposals so far such as [13–17].
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a colluding attack against
the CTP protocol. We show that two colluding tags are able to complete
a run of the CTP protocol successfully and generate a valid grouping
proof with the presence of only one of the tags. Then, we propose a
new grouping proof protocol based on elliptic curves which fixes the
problem.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we describe the CTP protocol and its security claims, then
Section 3 presents a colluding attack scenario against the CTP protocol.
In order to fix the problem, a new grouping protocol is proposed in Sec-
tion 4 with its security analysis. In Section 5, we compare our proposal
with the CTP protocol from security and computation perspectives and
finally Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 THE CTP PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the CTP protocol. But first we explain the
notations and assumptions used hereafter.
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• P: Elliptic curve base point.
• TA, TB: Tag A and tag B respectively.
• R: Reader.
• V: Verifier.
• y, Y = yP: Verifier’s private and public keys respectively.
• sa, sb: Tag A and tag B’s private keys respectively.
• x(T): x-coordinate of point T on the elliptic curve.
• PAB : grouping proof of tag A and tag B.
2 .1 AS S U M P T I O N S
It should be noted that the CTP protocol is executed under following
assumptions:
• There are three entities involved in the protocol: some tags, a
reader and a verifier.
• The task of the reader is to coordinate the execution of the protocol,
collect the grouping proof and forward it to the verifier. The reader
is not necessarily trusted by the tags or the verifier.
• The verifier is trusted and the public-key Y of the verifier is a
publicly known system parameter. Only the verifier knows the
corresponding private-key y.
• Knowledge of y is a necessary requirement to check the correct-
ness of a grouping proof. The result of a verification claim is
failure, or it reveals the identities of the involved tags.
• It is hard to solve the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem, i.e. given
P and aP in Elliptic Curve with a randomly chosen in Zq =
[0, q− 1], it is hard to compute a.
• It is hard to solve the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem,
i.e. given P, aP, bP with a and b randomly chosen in Zq and given
cP = abP with probability 12 and cP = dP with probability
1
2 with
d randomly chosen in Zq, it is hard to decide whether abP equals
cP .
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2.2 DE S C R I P T I O N
Without loss of generality, we explain the two-party version of the CTP
protocol. This protocol can be easily extended to more than two tags as
described in [13].
The two-party version of the CTP protocol is shown in Fig.1. The reader
initiates the interrogation by sending the messages "start left” to one of
the tags (TA). Then, TA generates a random number ra and computes
its corresponding Elliptic curve point (Ta,1 = raP) and sends it back to
the reader. The reader then initiates a simultaneous interrogation with
another tag (TB) by transmitting the "start right” message following
by a random challenge generated by the reader rs and Ta,1 received
from TA. TB computes Tb,1 = rbP and Tb,2 = (rb + x(rsTa,1)sb)Y. Then,
both of the generated messages are transmitted to the reader. The
reader passes Tb,2 to TA and the protocol concludes by transmission of
Ta,2 = (ra + x(Tb,2)sa)Y from TA to the reader.
The grouping proof, collected by the reader, consists of the tuple in (1).
PAB = {Ta,1, Ta,2, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2} (1)
This tuple is sent to the verifier to verify the grouping proof constructed
by TA and TB. The verifier checks whether the following equations hold.
Sa = saP = (y−1Ta,2 − Ta,1)x(Tb,2)−1 (2)
Sb = sbP = (y−1Tb,2 − Tb,1)x(rsTa,1)−1 (3)
where Sa and Sb are the public keys of TA and TB respectively and are
registered in the database of the verifier. If so, the grouping proof is
accepted.
2 .3 SE C U R I T Y CL A I M S
Due to its construction, the CTP grouping-proof protocol is claimed
to inherit the security properties of the EC-RAC III authentication
protocol [20]. The EC-RAC III latter is designed to provide secure entity
authentication against an active adversary, and was informally shown
to be equivalent to the Schnorr protocol [18].
The security claims on the CTP protocol can be divided into to two
different security issues, Privacy and Forgery prevention of the grouping
proof.
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Tag A Reader Tag B
sa sb
"start left”←−−−−−−−−−−−
ra ∈R Zq
Ta,1=ra P−−−−−−−−−−−→
rs ∈R Zq
"start right”,rs ,Ta,1
−−−−−−−−−−−→
rb ∈R Zq
Tb,1=rbP←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tb,2=(rb+x(rsTa,1)sb)Y
Tb,2←−−−−−−−−−−−
Ta,2=(ra+x(Tb,2)sa)Y−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 1: Two-party version of the CTP protocol
2.3 .1 PR I VA C Y
In [22], Vaudenay has presented a classification of privacy in RFID sys-
tems. Vaudenay’s model defines eight classes of adversarial capabilities.
These capabilities are in two orthogonal parts:
1. Four different types of tag corruptions: strong, forward, destructive
and weak.
2. Two modes of observations: wide and narrow.
Referring to this classification, the CTP protocol is claimed to be narrow-
strong private, although no formal proof for this is given in the original
paper. This claim has been recently invalidated [23]. However, verifica-
tion of this claim has not been addressed in this paper.
2 .3 .2 FO R G E RY PR E V E N T I O N
Being a grouping proof protocol, the CTP must prevent the generation of
a valid grouping proof without the involved tags actually participating
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in the protocol. This implies that the protocol must resist against the
following potential attack scenarios:
• Compromised tag: One tag is compromised, the reader is non-
compromised.
• Man-in-the-middle attack: The reader is compromised (the tags are
honest).
• Colluding reader and tag: The reader and one of the tags are com-
promised.
• Colluding tags: The reader is non-compromised, both tags are com-
promised. The tags can exchange some messages in advance (e.g.,
via another reader), but do not know each other’s private key.
• Replay attack performed by an outsider: An eavesdropper scans two
non-compromised tags simultaneously and replays the copied
message-flow to impersonate the two tags.
The CTP protocol is claimed to be resistant against the impersonation
of a tag in all of the above attack scenarios. Namely,an adversary needs
to either know the private-key of that particular tag or be able to solve
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem to impersonate it in this
protocol. This claim has been addressed through this paper and an
attack, which negates this claim, will be described in the next section.
3 OU R C O L L U D I N G TA G S AT TA C K
In this section, we elaborate an attacking scenario against the CTP pro-
tocol. In our attack, we take the colluding tags scenario which implies
that the reader is trusted, but both tags are compromised, and tags can
exchange some messages in advance (e.g. via another reader), but they
do not know each other’s private key.
Our attacking scenario is divided into two phases: conspiracy phase and
deceit phase. In the conspiracy phase, the two tags secretly negotiate
via a rogue reader (Reader*). In this negotiation, as Figure 2 shows, one
of the tags (e.g. tag B) sends H = sbY to tag A. H is the point multipli-
cation operation of tag B’s private key (sb) and verifier’s public key (Y)
on the Elliptic Curve group. It should be mentioned that message H
does not reveal any information on sb due to discrete logarithm (DL)
problem.
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Tag A Reader* Tag B
sa sb
H=sbY←−−−−−−−−−−−
H←−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 2: Phase I: Conspiracy Phase
Having H known, tag A is able to impersonate tag B in the CTP
protocol.
Figure 3 shows the detail of a successful completion of the CTP
protocol run with inclusion of only one of the tags. The only message
of the CTP protocol, which includes tag B’s private key, is Tb,2 which
can be easily forged by (5) if a tag accesses H.
Tb,2 = (rb + x(rsTa,1)sb)Y (4)
Tb,2 = (rbY + x(rsTa,1)sbY) = (rbY + x(rsTa,1)H) (5)
As it can be seen, knowing H = sbY is adequate to impersonate tag B
in the CTP protocol without revealing any information about its private
key sb.
4 PR O P O S E D PR O TO C O L
In Section 3, we showed that the CTP protocol is vulnerable to some
colluding tags attacks. In this section, we propose a new scheme based
on elliptic curve notion with the same security level from privacy per-
spective but resistant against colluding attacks from forgery prevention
perspective.
4 .1 DE S C R I P T I O N
Our proposal is based on an authentication protocol proposed by
Bringer et al. called "Randomized Schnorr”(Figure 4 [19]. This protocol
has been formally proved to be narrow-strong private.
The two-party version of our proposed protocol is shown in Figure 5.
The reader initiates the interrogation by sending the messages "start left”
to one of the tags (TA). Then, TA generates two random numbers αa and
βa and computes their point multiplication on P and Y Elliptic curve
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Tag A Reader Tag A
sa sa
"start left”←−−−−−−−−−−−
ra ∈R Zq
Ta,1=ra P−−−−−−−−−−−→
rs ∈R Zq
"start right”,rs ,Ta,1
−−−−−−−−−−−→
rb ∈R Zq
Tb,1=rbP←−−−−−−−−−−−
Tb,2=rbY+x(rsTa,1)H
Tb,2←−−−−−−−−−−−
Ta,2=(ra+x(Tb,2)sa)Y−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 3: Phase II: Deceit Phase
Tag Reader
s, I = sP P, υP υ
α, β ∈R Zq
T1=αP−−−−−−−−−−−→
T2=βυP
c ∈R Zq
y = α+ β+ sc mod q
y
−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check whether
I = c−1(yP− T1 − υ−1T2)
Fig. 4: Randomized Schnorr protocol
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right” message following by a random challenge generated by the reader rs and
Ta,2 received from TA. TB computes Tb,1 = αbP and Tb,2βbY , the same as TA
did. In addition, it also generates a scalar number tb,3 = (αb + βb + x(rsTa,2)sb)
mod q. Then, all of the three generated messages are transmitted to the reader.
The reader passes tb,3 to TA and the protocol concludes by transmission of scalar
ta,3 = αa + βa + tb,3sa from TA to the reader. The grouping proof, collected by
the reader, consists of the tuple (6).
PAB = {Ta,1, Ta,2, Ta,3, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2, Tb,3} (6)
To verify the grouping proof constructed by TA and TB , the verifier checks
whether the Equations (7) and (8) hold.
Sa = saP = x
−1(Tb,3)(ta,3P − Ta,1 − y−1Ta,2) (7)
Sb = sbP = x
−1(rsTa,2)(tb,3P − Tb,1 − y−1Tb,2) (8)
Tag A Reader Tag B
sa sb
”start left”
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
αa, βa ∈R Zq
Ta,1=αaP
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Ta,2=βaY
rs ∈R Zq
”start right”,rs,Ta,2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
αb, βb ∈R Zq
Tb,1=αbP, Tb,2=βbY
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
tb,3=(αb+βb+x(rsTa,2)sb) mod q
tb,3
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
ta,3=αa+βa+tb,3sa mod q
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 5. Proposed grouping protocol
4.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol in the same security
framework used for the CTP protocol.
Fig. 5: Proposed grouping protocol
points respectively (Ta,1 = αaP, Ta,2 = βaY ) and sends it to the reader
in return. The reader then initiates a simultaneous interrogation with
another tag (TB) by transmi ting the "start right” message following
by a random challenge generated by the reader rs and Ta,2 received
from TA. TB computes Tb,1 = αbP and Tb,2βbY, the same as TA did. In
addition, it also generates a scalar number tb,3 = (αb + βb + x(rsTa,2)sb)
mod q. Then, all of the three generated messages are transmitted to
the reader. The reader passes tb,3 to TA and the protocol concludes by
transmission of scalar ta,3 = αa + βa + tb,3sa from TA to the reader. The
grouping proof, collected by the reader, consists of the tuple (6).
PAB = {Ta,1, Ta,2, Ta,3, rs, Tb,1, Tb,2, Tb,3} (6)
To verify the grouping proof constructed by TA and TB, the verifier
checks whether the Equations (7) and (8) hold.
Sa = saP = x−1(Tb,3)(ta,3P− Ta,1 − y−1Ta,2) (7)
Sb = sbP = x−1(rsTa,2)(tb,3P− Tb,1 − y−1Tb,2) (8)
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4.2 SE C U R I T Y AN A LY S I S
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol in the same
security framework used for the CTP protocol.
4 .2 .1 PR I VA C Y
Theorem 1. Assume the hardness of the DDH problem, then Randomized
Schnorr is narrow-strong private.
Proof : [19]
Theorem 2. Assume that the Randomized Schnorr is narrow-strong pri-
vate, our proposed protocol is privacy-preserving against narrow-strong ad-
versary.
Proof : As explained, to prove the privacy, it is necessary to prove
that we can simulate the tags outputs. In the following, we construct a
simulation and we show that an adversary who is able to distinguish
between this simulation and the outputs of genuine tags in the proposed
protocol will be able to do the same for the Randomized Schnorr
protocol.
The outputs of the tags in the proposed are as following:
TA: Ta,1 = αaP, Ta,2 = βaY, ta,3 = αa + βa + tb,3sa
TB: Tb,1 = αbP, Tb,2 = βbY, tb,3 = (αb + βb + x(rsTa,2)sb)
The outputs of each tag is easily mapped on the outputs of a generic tag
in the Randomized Schnorr protocol, namely T1 = αP, T2 = βυP, y =
α+ β+ sc. In other words, the proposed protocol is simply two runs
of the Randomized Schnorr protocol regarding the tags outputs. This
simply proves the privacy attribute inheritance of the proposed protocol
from the Randomized Schnorr protocol.
4 .2 .2 FO R G E RY PR E V E N T I O N
Theorem 3. Assume the Schnorr scheme is secure against active imperson-
ation attacks, then Randomized Schnorr is secure against active imperson-
ation attacks.
Proof : [19]
Theorem 4. Assume the randomized Schnorr scheme is secure against
active impersonation attacks, then our proposed protocol is secure against
active impersonation attacks.
Proof : It is obvious that interrogation of TA in the proposed protocol
is a complete run of the Randomized Schnorr protocol and inherits
the security attribute of the Randomized Schnorr protocol stated in
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Theorem 3. The interrogation of TB, however, is slightly different from
a normal run of the Randomized Schnorr protocol. So, in our proof we
focus on the right part of the protocol runs between the reader and TB.
In order to proof the theorem, we devise a proof by contradiction ap-
proach. Assume there exists an active adversary A against the proposed
protocol. Given a system of tags T and a reader executing the Ran-
domized Schnorr protocol, we transform the tags’ normal outputs to
simulate tags’ outputs in the proposed protocol. So doing, we convert
A into an adversary against the Randomized Schnorr protocol.
First, when A interrogates TB, she sends rs and Ta,2 to the tag. We
intercept this message. Then, tag outputs T1 = Tb,1 and T2 = Ta,2. We
intercept these two messages and send back c = x(rsTa,2) to the tag.
The tag responses y = (αb + βb + csb). We forward this message to the
adversary as tb,3 = y. Clearly, from A’s point of view, TA is using the
proposed protocol.
Now, A tries to impersonate TB by interacting with the reader. First,
we pick a random number r′s and one random Elliptic curve point
T′a,2 and send them to A. As A is able to impersonate TB against
the proposed protocol then she is able to compute a couple tuple
T′b,1 = α
′
bP, T
′
b,2 = β
′
bY and t
′
b,3 = (α
′
b + β
′
b + x(r
′
sT′a,2)s′b) on receiv-
ing the challenges such that there exists an Sb verifying S′b = s
′
bP =
x−1(rsTa,2)(tb,3P− Tb,1 − y−1Tb,2).
For this reason, we are able to uniquely compute T1 and T2, to receive
a challenge c and to compute y such that there exists an I with I =
c−1(yP− T1 − υ−1T2). In this way, we showed that by using A, we are
able to impersonate TB against the Randomized Schnorr protocol which
negates our assumption.
One can demonstrate that to impersonate a tag in either of the attack
scenarios stated in Section 2.3, the adversary needs to know the private-
key of that particular tag (or be able to solve the DDH problem).
5 CO M PA R I S O N
Table 2 summarizes the comparison between the CTP and our proposed
protocol in terms of security and computation.
Security wise, our proposed protocol has accomplished to yield the
same but formally proved privacy level and higher security from forgery
prevention perspective, due to formally proved resistance against the
colluding tags attack.
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Security Computation
Privacy Forgery # of EC point # of EC point
Prevention multiplications multiplications
for the verifier for each tag
CTP narrow-strong Not Secure 4 2
(Not formally proved)
Proposed narrow-strong 6 2
Protocol (Formally proved) Secure
Table 1. Comparison of the CTP protocol and the proposed protocol
multiplication of its private key and the verifier’s public key. As this point mul-
tiplication does not reveal any information about the tag’s private key, it can be
exploited by colluding tags to generate a grouping proof with presence of only
one of the tags.
In order to fix this problem, we proposed a new grouping protocol based on el-
liptic curves which prevents the colluding attacks and proved its security proper-
ties. In Summary, compared to the CTP protocol, our proposal has the following
properties:
– Formally provable narrow-strong privacy.
– Formally provable prevention against forged proof generation.
– The same amount of computational overhead on tag sides.
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• Formally provable narrow-strong privacy.
• Formally provable prevention against forged proof generation.
• The same amount of computational overhead on tag sides.
RE F E R E N C E S
[1] Ari Juels, Yoking-Proofs for RFID Tags, In the Proceedings of First
International Workshop on Pervasive Computing and Communica-
tion Security, IEEE Press, pp.138–143, (2004).
[2] Junichiro Saitoh and Kouichi Sakurai, Grouping Proofs for RFID
Tags, In the Proceedings of AINA International Conference, IEEE
Computer Society, pp. 621–624, (2005).
[3] Selwyn Piramuthu, On Existence Proofs for Multiple RFID Tags, In
the Proceedings of ACS/IEEE International Conference on Perva-
sive Services, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 317–320, (2006).
[4] Chih-Chung Lin, Yuan-Cheng Lai, J. D. Tygar, Chuan-Kai Yang and
Chi-Lung Chiang, Coexistence Proof using Chain of Timestamps
for Multiple RFID Tags, In the Proceedings of APWeb/WAIM In-
ternational Workshop, Springer-Verlag LNCS 5189, pp. 634–643,
(2007).
[5] Mike Burmester, Breno de Medeiros, and Rossana Motta, Prov-
ably Secure Grouping-Proofs for RFID Tags, In the Proceedings of
CARDIS International Conference, Springer-Verlag LNCS 5189, pp.
176–190, (2008).
[6] C.-Y. K. Hsieh-Hong Huang, A RFID Grouping Proof Protocol for
Medication Safety of Inpatient, Journal of Medical Systems, (2008).
[7] P. Peris-Lopez, J. Hernandez-Castro, J. Estevez-Tapiador, and A. Rib-
agorda, Solving the Simultaneous Scanning Problem Anonymously:
Clumping Proofs for RFID Tags, in Security, Privacy and Trust in
Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing, SECPerU (2007).
[8] L. Bolotnyy and G. Robins, Generalized Yoking-Proofs for a Group
of RFID Tags, in Proc. International Conference on Mobile and
Ubiquitous Systems (Mobiquitous), (2006).
[9] Hung-Min Sun, Wei-Chih Ting, Shih-Ying Chang, Offlined Simul-
taneous Grouping Proof for RFID Tags,The Second International
133
Security Analysis Of Lightweight Schemes for RFID Systems
Workshop on Multimedia, Information Privacy and Intelligent Com-
puting Systems(MPIS),(2009).
[10] Y. Lien, X. Leng, K. Mayes, and J. Chiu, Reading Order Independent
Grouping Proof for RFID Tags, IEEE International Conference on
Intelligence and Security Informatics,ISI 2008. , (2008).
[11] Hung-Yu Chien, Tree-Based RFID Yoking Proof, International
Conference on Networks Security, Wireless Communications and
Trusted Computing, (2009).
[12] Dang Nguyen Duc, Jangseong Kim, Kwangjo Kim, Scalable
Grouping-proof Protocol for RFID Tags, SCIS 2010 The Symposium
on Cryptography and Information Security, (2010).
[13] Lejla Batina, Yong Ki Lee, Stefaan Seys, Dave Singelee, Ingrid Ver-
bauwhede, Short Paper: Privacy-preserving ECC-based grouping proofs
for RFID, In Information Security - 13th International Conference,
ISC 2010 , Boca Raton, Florida, Oct. 25–28,(2010).
[14] Sandeep S. Kumar, Christof Paar. Are standards compliant Elliptic
Curve Cryptosystems feasible on RFID?.Workshop on RFID Security ,
Graz, Austria, July (2006).
[15] Franz Furbass, Johannes Wolkerstorfer. ECC Processor with Low
Die Size for RFID Applications, IEEE International Symposium on
Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), (2007).
[16] Yong Ki Lee Sakiyama, K. Batina, L. Verbauwhede. Elliptic-Curve-
Based Security Processor for RFID, IEEE Transactions on Computers,
1514 –1527 ,(2008).
[17] Daniel Hein, Johannes Wolkerstorfer, Norbert Felber,ECC Is Ready
for RFID - A Proof in Silicon, SAC 2008, LNCS , pp. 401–413, (2008).
[18] C. P. Schnorr. Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart
Cards. In G. Brassard, editor, Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO
’89), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS 435, pages 239–252.
Springer-Verlag, (1989).
[19] Julien Bringer, Herv´e Chabanne, and Thomas Icart. Cryptanalysis
of EC-RAC, a RFID identification protocol. In CANS, volume 5339 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (2008).
[20] Yong Ki Lee, Lejla Batina, Dave Singelee, and Ingrid Verbauwhede.
Low-Cost Untraceable Authentication Protocols for RFID. In Proceed-
134
Colluding Tags Attack on the ECC-based Grouping Proofs for RFIDs
ings of the 3rd ACM conference on Wireless network security (WiSec
2010),(2010).
[21] Fan, J., Hermans, J., Vercauteren, F.: On the claimed privacy
of EC-RAC III. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/132„
http://eprint.iacr.org, (2010).
[22] Serge Vaudenay. On privacy models for RFID. In ASIACRYPT,
(2007).
[23] C. Lv and H. Li and J. Ma and B. Niu and H. Jiang. Security Analysis
of a Privacy-preserving ECC-based Grouping-proof Protocol. Journal of
Convergence Information Technology,(2011).
135

VPAPER V
ON THE PR IVACY OF TWO TAG
OWNERSH IP TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
FOR RF IDS ∗
Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh
∗Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh, “On the Privacy of Two Tag Owner-
ship Transfer Protocols for RFIDs”, IEEE International Conference for Internet
Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST2011) in Abu Dhabi, UAE.

O N T H E P R I VA C Y O F T W O TA G
O W N E R S H I P T R A N S F E R P R O T O C O L S
F O R R F I D S
Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh∗
Abstract. In this paper, the privacy of two recent RFID
tag ownership transfer protocols are investigated against
the tag owners as adversaries.
The first protocol called ROTIV is a scheme which provides
a privacy-preserving ownership transfer by using an HMAC-
based authentication with public key encryption. However,
our passive attack on this protocol shows that any legitimate
owner which has been the owner of a specific tag is able to
trace it either in the past or in the future. Tracing the tag is
also possible via an active attack for any adversary who is
able to tamper the tag and extract its information.
The second protocol called, Chen et al.’s protocol, is an
ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID tags which
conforms EPC Class1 Generation2 standard. Our attack on
this protocol shows that the previous owners of a particular
tag are able to trace it in future. Furthermore, they are able
even to obtain the tag’s secret information at any time in the
future which makes them capable of impersonating the tag.
Key Words: RFID, Ownership Transfer, Privacy.
1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
Radio frequency identification(RFID) is currently considered as the
next generation technology that mainly used to identify massive objects
∗Department of Informatics, University of Bergen
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in an automated way and will substitute traditional optical barcode
system in near future. The RFID advantages such as reducing supply
chain inefficiencies and improving inventory flow leaves no doubt that
the dominant deployment of barcodes nowadays in supply chain will
be promptly taken over by RFID tags. But it has its own drawbacks too.
As products flow through a supply chain, their ownership is trans-
ferred from one partner to the next. This transfer of ownership extends
to the RFID tags attached to these products. Thus all information as-
sociated with the tag will need to be passed from the current to the
new owner. However, at the moment of tag ownership transfer, both the
current and new owners have the information necessary to authenticate
a tag, and this fact may cause an infringement of tag owner privacy [5].
To handle this problem, tag ownership transfer protocols are pro-
posed to transfer the ownership of a tag from one owner to another
securely. The proposed schemes for ownership transfer protocols are di-
vided into two groups. Some schemes exploit a trusted third party(TTP)
which acts as a secure channel to transfer some information between
the entities. One of the first solution of this kind was proposed by Saito
et al.[6]. However, the security of their scheme is only based on the short
read range of the backward channel (tag to reader communication) by
assuming that it is hard for adversaries to eavesdrop on this channel.
Another scheme with TTP is proposed by Molnar et al. [7]. They exploit
the TTP to manage tag keys by a tree structure. But in this protocol
one key is shared by several tags which makes this protocol vulnerable.
The privacy of the whole system decreases quickly when more tags are
compromised [8].
There also exist some decentralized proposals without a using TTP.
Most of these schemes have two following assumptions: there is a
secure channel between the current and new owner to pass the tag’s
information securely. They also assume that the new owner and the
tag will be able to execute an authentication session in an isolated
environment without presence of the current owner after the ownership
transfer is completed in order to update some secret parameters.
For instance, Soppera and Burbridge [9] adopt the scheme of Molnar
et al. by replacing the TTP with some distributed local devices called
RFID acceptor tag. In [13], the authors have also proposed a decentral-
ized protocol relying on the assumption that owners are able to change
the tag key in an isolated environment. However, this protocol has se-
curity vulnerabilities well described in [14]. Song et al. [11] proposed a
scheme with introduction of a new property called authorization recovery
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which facilitates the ownership transfer of a tag to its previous owner.
But Pedro et al. [12] showed that their schemes has some vulnerabilities
as well.
Recently, two other tag ownership transfer protocols have been pro-
posed. The first scheme is called an RFID ownership transfer with
issuer verification (ROTIV) [16] which provides a constant-time, privacy-
preserving tag ownership transfer. The ROTIV’s main idea is to combine
an HMAC-based authentication with public key encryption. The second
scheme which is proposed by Chen et al. [17], proposes an RFID owner-
ship transfer systems which conforms the requirements of EPCglobal
Class-1 Generation-2 Standard.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we investigate the privacy of two
aforementioned ownership transfer protocols. The investigation in-
cludes some attacks to violate the forward and backward privacy as
well as previous and new owner privacy properties of the schemes.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the privacy issues and properties required for tag ownership
transfer protocols as well as system and adversary modelings. In Sec-
tions 3 and 4 the description of the the ROTIV and Chen et al. protocols
and our attack on them are presented respectively, and finally, Section
5 concludes the paper.
2 PR E L I M I N A R I E S
To lend clarity to our discussions in the subsequent sections, in this sec-
tion, we outline the models and properties used in ownership transfer
protocol.
2 .1 SY S T E M MO D E L
In ownership transfer protocols, there are mainly three active entities
involved: current owner, tag and new owner. The owners in an ownership
transfer protocols are some readers in practice which take the role of
ownership in these kinds of protocols. The ownership transfer protocols
typically provide a solution to transfer the tag’s information from the
current owner to the new owner.
Most of the ownership transfer protocols consist of two phases, an
authentication phase and a ownership transfer phase. By the former phase,
the tag and two owners are mutually authenticated and the latter phase
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assures all three entities that the ownership of the tag is transferred in
a proper and privacy-preserving way.
2 .2 PR I VA C Y PR O P E RT I E S
Generic privacy properties and how to formalize them for RFID systems
have been extensively explored in the literature [1–4]. The two generic
privacy property we address in this paper are:
• Backward Privacy: an adversary should not be able to to trace
past transactions between an owner and a tag, even if it compro-
mises/tamper the tag.
• Forward Privacy: an adversary should not be able to to trace fu-
ture transactions between an owner and a tag, even if it compro-
mises/tamper the tag.
On the other hand, in tag ownership transfer protocols changes of tag
owner could occur frequently and at the moment of tag ownership
transfer, both the current and new owners have the information neces-
sary to authenticate a tag, and this fact may cause an infringement of tag
owner privacy. Therefore, there are two extra privacy issues dedicated
for ownership transfer protocols in the literature [10, 15]:
• New owner privacy: Once ownership of a tag has been transferred
to a new owner, only the new owner should be able to identify
and control the tag. The previous owner of the tag should no
longer be able to identify or trace the tag.
• Current/previous owner privacy: When ownership of a tag has been
transferred to a new owner, the new owner of a tag should not
be able to trace past interactions between the tag and its previous
owner.
2 .3 AD V E R S A RY MO D E L
In [3], Juels and Weis give a formal model of the privacy in RFID
systems. In this model, tags (T ) and readers/owners (R) interact in
protocol sessions. During this interaction there is also an adversary
entity A which passively or actively interacts with them. The adversary
may have access to an oracle which can be queried by the following
queries:
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• Execute(T ,R, i): This query is responded by the information of T
and R interactions in an honest protocol session at time instance
i.
• Send(P1,P2, i, m): This query models active attacks by allowing
the adversary A to impersonate some entity, a tag or a reader, P1
in some protocol session i and send a message m of its choice to
an instance of some other entity P2.
• Corrupt(T ): This query allows the adversary A to tamper the tag
to learn the stored secret information of the tag T
• Test(i, T0, T1): This query is responded by a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and the interaction information of the tag T0 and T1 with the
reader/owner at ith time instance.
2 .4 AT TA C K SC E N A R I O
In [3], the adversary A aims at tracing a specific target tag T. To do so,
she,
• absorbs the information she requires about the target tag T by the
means of queries previously described.
• choose two test tags T0 and T1 where one of them is T, and asks
the oracle for the challenge by Test query. The response will be
the interactions between the T0 and T1 tags with the reader R at a
specific time instance.
The adversary succeeds to violate the privacy of the tag by tracing it,
if she is able to distinguish the tag T between the two tested tags by
outputting 0 or 1.
2 .5 NO TAT I O N S
Here, we explain the notations used hereafter.
• Ek(.): Symetric/asymetric encryption function operation with the
key k.
• pkX , skX : Public and private key of entity X respectively.
• hk(.): Keyed hash function with key k.
• h(.): Hash functions.
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• PRNG(.): Pseudo random number generator.
• T, On, On+1: Tag, current owner and new owner.
• IDX : The identification (ID) of entity X.
• NX : Random numbers generated by entity X.
• mi: dynamic value m at time instance i.
3 ROTIV PR O TO C O L
ROTIV is a decentralized scheme which does not require a trusted
third party to perform tag ownership transfer. This protocol provides
issuer verification that allows prospective owners to check the identity
of the entity which has issued the tag. The authors have claimed that
their scheme ensures both forward and backward privacy and it also
preserves current and new owner privacy.
There are four entities involved in the protocol, a tag T, current owner
On, new owner On+1 and issuer I which initializes the tag and owners.
In ROTIV, the T stores a symmetric key k, a state parameter s, where
k is a key shared between the tag and its owner and s is an Elgamal
encryption of T’s identification information.
3 .1 PR E L I M I N A R I E S
Bilinear pairing
Let G1, G2 and GT be groups, such that G1 and G2 have the same
prime order q. Pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT is a bilinear pairing if has the
following properties:
1. bilinear: ∀a, b ∈ Zq , g1 ∈ G1 and g2 ∈ G2 , e(ga1, gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab.
2. computable: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g1, g2) for
any (g1, g2) ∈ G1 ×G2;
3. non-degenerate: if g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator of
G2, then e(g1, g2) is a generator GT .
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3.2 DE S C R I P T I O N
Setup: The issuer I outputs (q,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e), where G1, GT are
subgroups of prime order q, g1 and g2 are random generators of G1
and G2 respectively, and e : G1 ×G2 → GT is a bilinear pairing.
The issuer chooses x ∈ Z∗q and computes the pair (gx1 , gx2). The I’s
public and secret keys are:
skI = (x, gx1), pkI = g
x
2 (1)
I randomly selects αn ∈ Z∗q and provides each owner On with a secret
key skOn = αn and a public key pkOn = (g
α2n
1 , g
αn
2 ). All owners know
each other’s public keys.
Tag Initialization: The issuer I picks a random number t ∈ Fq,
where Fq is the finite field with q elements. Using a cryptographic
hash function h : Fq → G1, I computes u0 = 1 and v0 = hx(t). Finally,
I chooses randomly a key k0 ∈ Fq and stores: (k0, s0), where s0 =
(u0, v0) into the tag. I also provides On with T’s information re f On . This
information includes two dynamic values kold, knew which are updated
after each successful transaction and two static values δ = t,ψ = hx(t)
which represent the identification of the issuer of the tag.
re f On = (kold, knew, δ,ψ) = (k0, k0, t, hx(t)) (2)
Before accepting the tag, the owner can read the tag and checks the
authenticity of the static values of the tag:
e(h(δ), pkI) = e(ψ, g2) (3)
Ownership Transfer: The ROTIV ownership transfer protocol (Fig.1)
is a combination of two mutual authentication sessions between the
tag and current and new owners with the ownership transfer protocol
between the current owner On and the new owner On+1.
In ith time instance of the ROTIV protocol:
1. New owner On+1 generates a random nonce NOn+1 and sends it to
the tag and the current owner simultaneously.
2. The tag T also generates a random number NT and send it with its
status parameter si = (ui, vi) and a hash mi = hki (NOn+1 , NT , si) to the
new owner.
3. On+1 selects a random number rv and computes Av = u
rv
i . Then, it
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sends NOn+1 , NT , si, mi and Av to the current owner On. In this way, On
is able to authenticate the tag by computing,
ψ =
vi
(ui)α
2
n
(4)
Then, it searches in the database to see if ψ is in the database or not.
If not, it aborts authentication. Otherwise, it looks up T’s ownership
references re f On in the database to checks if mi = hknewi (NOn+1 , NT , si)
or mi = hkoldi
(NOn+1 , NT , si). For the former case ki = k
new
i and for the
latter case ki = koldi .
4. If the authentication process succeeds On gives On+1 the following
information via a secure channel:
re f V = (A, B, C) = (t, hx(t), Aαnv ) (5)
re f On = (kold, knew, δ,ψ) = (ki, ki+1, t, hx(t)) (6)
The new owner On+1 check the validity of the provided information by
(3).
Now, the new owner can verify whether the issuer of the tag T is I by
checking whether the following equations hold:
e(h(A), pkI) = e(B, g2) (7)
e(C, g2) = e(Av, g
αn
2 ) (8)
e(vi, g2)rv = e(B, g2)rv e(C, g
αn
2 ) (9)
5. If the verification succeeds, On+1 chooses a new random number ri+1
and computes:
si+1 = (ui, vi) = (g
ri+1
1 , h
x(t).gα
2
nri+1
1 ) (10)
mi+1 = hki (NT , si+1) (11)
and sends si+1, mi+1 to the tag and updates its database. Now, T au-
thenticates On+1 by checking the content of mi+1. If the authentication
succeeds T updates its state parameter to si+1 and its symmetric key to
the new key ki+1 where,
ki+1 = PRNG(ki, NOn+1) (12)
In order to prevent the current owner from tracing the tag later in the
future, the new owner has to run a mutual authentication with the tag
outside the range of the current owner after the ownership transfer is
complete.
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T On+1 On
NOn+1←−−−−−−−−−−−
NOn+1−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ,si ,mi−−−−−−−−−−−→
mi ,si ,NT ,Av−−−−−−−−−−−→
re f On ,re f V
←−−−−−−−−−−−
mi+1,si+1←−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 1: Ownership transfer in ROTIV
3.3 OU R AT TA C K S
In this attack, we target mainly the ownership privacy including current
and new owner privacy of the ROTIV protocol. Correspondingly, the
adversary A has been one of the owners of the tag T at least once.
For example, without loss of generality, we can assume that A = On.
Therefore, at a time instance e.g. i, she has had access to the tags’s
information re f On . We also assume that the adversary is passive and
thus has access only to Execute and Test queries.
According to the attacking scenario described in Section 2.4, the adver-
sary follows the procedure below to trace the tag T via distinguishing
that which of the two test tags, T0 and T1, are T.
1. A retrieves the static information of the tag T, δ = t,ψ = hx(t),
from the information she has been give at time i, re f On .
2. A queries Test(j, T0, T1) and obtains (13) and (14).
{NOl , NT0 , mj, mj+1, sj, sj+1} (13)
{NO′l , NT1 , m
′
j, m
′
j+1, s
′
j, s
′
j+1} (14)
which are the messages exchanged between the owner Ol and
tags T0 and T1 respectively.
3. A saves sj = (uj, vj) and s′i = (u′j, v′j).
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4. A checks whether (15) or (16) holds,
e(vj, g2) = e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
vj
ψ
), g2
)
(15)
e(v′j, g2) = e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
v′j
ψ
), g2
)
(16)
5. If (15) is correct then A outputs 0 i.e. T = T0, otherwise she
outputs 1 i.e. T = T1.
Note that we can write (15) because according to bilinear pairing prop-
erties of e, we have:
e(vi, g2) = e(hx(t).gα
2
l ri , g2)
= e(ψ.gα
2
l ri , g2)
= e(ψ, g2)e(g
α2l ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), gx2)e(g
α2l ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), pkI)e(g
α2l ri
1 , g2)
= e(h(δ), pkI)e
(
(
vi
ψ
), g2
)
Using the scenario above, any owner in the protocol which has had the
ownership of the tag T is able to trace it. It is worth mentioning that
since the update procedure of state values s are performed independent
of their previous values (step 5 of ownership transfer), the aforemen-
tioned tracing scenario can be applied both on the state values of the
past and the future. Hence any owner who has accessed to the static
values of a tag is able to trace it at any time in the past or future by only
eavesdropping state parameter of the tag s. It implies that the ROTIV
protocol lacks both previous owner and new owner privacy properties.
Remark 1. It should be noted that if an adversary A′ has access to
Corrupt query which gives her this privilege to tamper the tag and
access to the tag’s static information t, hx(t), her state of knowledge
about the tag is exactly the same as that the adversary A in the stated
attack. Hence, she will also be able to exploit (15) to trace T in any
time in the past and future. This implies that the ROTIV protocol lacks
forward and backward privacy as well.
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4 CH E N et al’S PR O TO C O L
Chen et al.’s protocol is designed to meet the requirements of EPC Class1
Generation2 standard (ISO18000-6C) for passive RFID tags. According
to this standard, RFID tags’s computation capabilities is restricted to
only performing a 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) and 16-bit
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG). The authors have claimed
that their scheme ensures both forward and backward privacy and it
also preserves current and new owner privacy.
There are four entities involved in the protocol, a tag T, current
owner On, new owner On+1 and issuer I which issues a new issuer
identification to be stored into the tags after each ownership transfer
phase.
4 .1 DE S C R I P T I O N
Chen et al.’s ownership transfer protocol consist of three phases: re-
quiring phase, authentication phase and ownership transfer phase. In Chen
et al.’s protocol, the T stores two dynamic symmetric keys ki, k∗i and the
h(ti) which is the hash of the issuer identification. In addition to the
tag’s information the owner has the issuer identification ti.
In the ith time instance of requiring phase (Fig.2), the current owner
first signs the tag’s certificate ti and the identification of the new owner:
SGOn = SignskOk (ti, IDOn+1) (17)
After that, it encrypts this message with the next owner’s public key to
get Ci:
Ci = EpkOn+1 (ti, SGOn) (18)
and transfers the message (IDOk , Ci) to the new owner On+1.
In authentication phase (Fig.3), the current owner first generates a
random number NOn and then computes Ai:
Ai = CRC(ki ⊕ NOn) (19)
On On+1
IDOk ,Ci−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 2: Requiring phase
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T On
h(ti), ki, k∗i ti, ki, k
∗
i
NOk ,A←−−−−−−−−−−−
NT ,Yi ,Zi−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 3: Authentication phase
and sends it with NOn to the tag. Upon receiving these messages, the
tag verifies the content of the message Ai. If the verification succeeds,
the tag generates a new random value NT , and computes the Xi, Yi and
Zi as following.
Xi = CRC(NT ⊕ k∗i ) (20)
Yi = k∗i ⊕ IDT ⊕ Xi ⊕ ki+1 (21)
Zi = CRC(Xi ⊕ ki ⊕Yi) (22)
Moreover, the tag updates its keys as:
ki+1 = (k∗i ⊕ IDT ⊕ NT ⊕Yi) (23)
k∗i+1 = PRNG(k
∗
i ) (24)
and transfers (NT , Yi, Zi) to the current owner. Upon receiving the
message, On checks the content of Xi and Zi. If this verification succeeds,
it obtains ki+1 and updates its values accordingly.
In the ownership transfer phase (Fig.4), the new owner On+1 uses
its own private key to decrypt Ci received in the requiring phase and
obtains SGOk and ti. Then, it uses the On’s public key pkOn to verify
the correction of SGOk . If the signature is verified successfully, the new
owner signs the ID of its own as well as the current owner’s:
SGOn+1 = SignskOk+1(IDOk , IDOn+1) (25)
And sends the tuple {IDOi , IDOi+1 , SGOi , SGOi+1 , ti} to the issuer I to
issue a new issuer identification for the tag.
The issuer checks the content of this message and if it is correct, it
issues the ti+1 and computes ti+1⊕ ki+1 and h(ti+1) and transmits them
to On. Upon receiving this message, On sends the former message to
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On+1 On I
{IDOk ,IDOn+1 ,
SGOk ,SGOn+1 ,ti}−−−−−−−−−−−→
{IDOk ,IDOn+1 ,IDR ,
SGOk ,SGOn+1 ,ti}−−−−−−−−−−−→
ti+1⊕ki+1,h(ti+1)←−−−−−−−−−−−
ti+1⊕ki+1←−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 4: Ownership transfer phase
the new owner and writes the latter one into the tag’s memory. The
new owner can also obtain the ti+1 by XORing the message received
from the current owner and the new key stored in the memory.
ti+1 = (ti+1 ⊕ ki+1)⊕ ki+1 (26)
4 .2 OU R AT TA C K
The adversary A in our attack is one of the previous owners of the tag
T. Therefore, she has had access to IDT , ki and k∗i , where the IDT is the
static ID of the tag T or the tag’s electronic product code(EPC) and ki
and k∗i are the dynamic keys of the tag at time instance i when the tag
has been in the possession of A as the owner.
Being given the messages exchanged between two tags T0, T1, which
one of them is the tag T, and another owner Ol at two consecutive
time instance j and j + 1, the adversary follows the procedure below to
distinguish which of the test tags is the tag T.
1. A retrieves the static identity of the tag T, IDT .
2. A queries Test(j, T0, T1),Test(j + 1, T0, T1)
and obtain
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{Aj, NT0 , NOl , Yj, Zj},{Aj+1, N′T0 , N′Ol , Yj+1, Zj+1}
Yj = k∗j ⊕ IDT0 ⊕ Xj ⊕ k j (27)
Yj+1 = k∗j+1 ⊕ IDT0 ⊕ Xj+1 ⊕ k j+1 (28)
Zj = CRC(Xj ⊕ k j+1 ⊕Yj) (29)
Zj+1 = CRC(Xj+1 ⊕ k j ⊕Yj+1) (30)
From (27), we have:
k j = k∗j ⊕Yj ⊕ IDT0 ⊕ Xj (31)
By substituting k j from (31) in (30), we can write:
Zj+1 = CRC(k∗j ⊕ IDT0 ⊕ Xj ⊕ Xj+1 ⊕Yj ⊕Yj+1) (32)
3. Now the adversary A defines the maximum number of iterations
as τ and follows the following steps to determine whether T0 is
the tag T. It should be noted that the same process can be used to
determine whether T1 is the tag T.
a) c = 1
b) computes:
k∗ = PRNGc(k∗i ) = PRNG(PRNG(...(k
∗
i )..))︸ ︷︷ ︸
c times
.
c) computes
Xj = CRC(k∗ ⊕ NT0) ,
Xj+1 = CRC(PRNG(k∗)⊕ N′T0).
d) computes ∆X = Xj ⊕ Xj+1,∆Y = Yj ⊕Yj+1 .
e) If Zj+1 6= CRC(k∗ ⊕ IDT ⊕ ∆X ⊕ ∆Y) and c < τ then c =
c + 1 and go to b
f) Else A outputs 0 i.e. T0 = T and k∗j = k∗.
This attack shows that the current owner of tag T will be able to trace
it at any time in future. Therefore, we can conclude that Chen et al.’s
protocol lacks new owner privacy.
Remark 2. It should be noted that the procedure above will work
when the number of iterations τ is less than the all possible values for
the key k∗j . This implies that if the length of key k
∗
j is n, τ << 2
n. So,
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the tracing process will work efficiently unless the number of passed
sessions are comparable to 2n.
Remark 3. Any adversary of this kind who has already obtained k∗j
from the above procedure is also able to calculate k j+1 by (23). Then she
will be able to extract ti+1 from the last message of the tag ownership
transfer protocol by using (26). This results in a more dangerous attack
in which the current owner is able to even impersonate the tag for future
interrogations.
5 CO N C L U S I O N
In this paper, we investigated the privacy of two ownership transfer
protocols. The investigation included the attacks to target the forward
and backward privacy as well as previous and new owner privacy
properties. Our results showed both protocols are vulnerable to the
attacks where the adversary is one of the owners in the system.
Any owner in the system as well as any adversary with the capability
of tampering the tag are able to trace the tag in the previous and future
interrogations in the ROTIV protocol. Therefore, this protocol lacks four
stated privacy properties, forward privacy, backward privacy, previous
owner privacy and new owner privacy.
Chen et al.’s protocol was also shown to be susceptible to the attacks
in which the adversary is one of the previous owners of the tag and
thus not to fulfil the forward privacy and new owner privacy. This
protocol also revealed the whole tag’s information to any previous
owner and makes the adversary capable of impersonating the tag in
further interrogations.
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